Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
1–10 of 27 posts
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#2This is the same kind of "safety measure actually increases attack surface" like antivirus programs.
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#3I have worked with such filters at some point earlier in life and had completely forgotten about them. This article brought back weird memories. It seemed like a good idea at the time. I think.
1: xkcd://327
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#4Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#5The attacker would also have to bypass the WAF while posting the trigger string, so perhaps it’s not trivial. Still, the whole design of these heuristic WAFs feel quite weak.
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#6The attacker would also have to bypass the WAF while posting the trigger string, so perhaps it’s not trivial. Still, the whole design of these heuristic WAFs feel quite weak.
Blocking responses based on the content returned is pretty silly in the first place, but the whole point is to prevent the data from leaving, not from coming in. In fact the whole reason the rules exist is to prevent the case where your database starts burping up data you don't want it to. But if you were blocking the data from being accepted in the first place you wouldn't have that data in your database to begin with.
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#7The attacker would also have to bypass the WAF while posting the trigger string, so perhaps it’s not trivial. Still, the whole design of these heuristic WAFs feel quite weak.
The component that's meant to prevent a debug message from spilling the naughty bits has no reason to inspect data flowing in the other direction.
Though I would just leave those strings out of the WAF.
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#8The attacker would also have to bypass the WAF while posting the trigger string, so perhaps it’s not trivial. Still, the whole design of these heuristic WAFs feel quite weak.
This is just plain wrong. A WAF rule meant to prevent credit card numbers from being output would not block the server from accepting credit card numbers. Or social security numbers, or any other kind of sensitive data. That would be wild. Blocking responses based on the content returned is pretty silly in the first place, but the whole point is to prevent the data from leaving, not from coming in. In fact the whole…
I mean, many of these dumb mistakes that someone would want their WAF to save them from, wouldn't be for leaks of user-provided PII, but rather for leaks of ops-provided secrets (e.g. connection credentials for upstream APIs), no?
Re: Response Filter Denial of Service: shut down a website by triggering WAF rule
#9The attacker would also have to bypass the WAF while posting the trigger string, so perhaps it’s not trivial. Still, the whole design of these heuristic WAFs feel quite weak.