Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
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Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
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Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#2If you want security, you have to do it in house with competent people who understand your business domain. So when I see people with regular pen tests I know they don't really give a shit because they are doing minimal ass coverage.
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#3Interesting read. I will point out that having seen "security audits" done by top tier well known security companies, they aren't worth the paper they are written on. They are selling you a pen test script run, the output of which is farted into a document for the least amount of time they can expend on it. If you want security, you have to do it in house with competent people who understand your business domain. So…
But I'm pretty sure in this case the scope was bad. Like they coukd have had audits on "Do I use OpenSSL well?" and then misrepresent that all their privacy claims were audited.
Now it seems like Skiff conveniently didn't allow Trail of Bits to publish their reports, they are usually here: https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/tree/master/revi...
Disclaimer, I have used Trail of Bits service in the past (and 2 other auditors for an security campaign on a blockchain, cryptography + networking product).
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#4Interesting read. I will point out that having seen "security audits" done by top tier well known security companies, they aren't worth the paper they are written on. They are selling you a pen test script run, the output of which is farted into a document for the least amount of time they can expend on it. If you want security, you have to do it in house with competent people who understand your business domain. So…
I can’t speak to Cure53 but I feel like I’ve seen that name on a few failed cryptocurrency thingies.
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#5Interesting read. I will point out that having seen "security audits" done by top tier well known security companies, they aren't worth the paper they are written on. They are selling you a pen test script run, the output of which is farted into a document for the least amount of time they can expend on it. If you want security, you have to do it in house with competent people who understand your business domain. So…
Really? That’s not my experience. I’m not denying companies are out there basically selling a rubber stamp like you say, but I’ve worked with sharp folks from Matasano and NCC Group who would go deep, learn from eng about system but also do blind red teaming, do physical pen tests etc. I think you’ll probably get what you pay for and get good results if you put in good effort working with them. I can’t speak to Cure5…
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#6I know some people do need more privacy and/or security. But a lot of people think they need the same but really, they don’t.
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#7ProtonMail can only guarantee E2E encryption without PGP if you are sending email to another ProtonMail user. I don't know if Skiff also offers this special kind of encryption. Either way, they should be more upfront about the level of privacy they can offer.
I had a read of Skiff's page on E2EE. It is very carefully worded and, from a skim read, is not upfront about the fact that un-PGP'd email sent and received through Skiff can be read by Skiff.
https://skiff.com/blog/end-to-end-encryption-email
Oh, one more thing. Skiff's SMTP server (inbound-smtp.skiff.com) is running on AWS in the United States which means it will be beholden to US warrants. Skiff does not have a warrant canary. Getting big Crypto AG vibes from this.
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#8We've considered adding a E2EE comparison column as well (with the issues such as Proton rewriting your emails @ http://jfloren.net/b/2023/7/7/0 highlighted).
Privacy Guides Discussion @ https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/forward-email-email-prov...
Unlike Skiff, Proton, and Tuta... we're _actually_ 100% open-source. Those providers that advertise as open-source really only open-source the front-end, when the back-end is the most sensitive part of an email service.
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#9Forward Email team here ( https://forwardemail.net ), we have a write-up and comparison @ https://forwardemail.net/en/blog/docs/best-quantum-safe-encr... We've considered adding a E2EE comparison column as well (with the issues such as Proton rewriting your emails @ http://jfloren.net/b/2023/7/7/0 highlighted). Privacy Guides Discussion @ https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/forward-email-email-prov... Unlike Skiff, P…
Re: Skiff: Various Privacy Failures
#10Forward Email team here ( https://forwardemail.net ), we have a write-up and comparison @ https://forwardemail.net/en/blog/docs/best-quantum-safe-encr... We've considered adding a E2EE comparison column as well (with the issues such as Proton rewriting your emails @ http://jfloren.net/b/2023/7/7/0 highlighted). Privacy Guides Discussion @ https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/forward-email-email-prov... Unlike Skiff, P…
This is really nice, but the blog does not address the weakest link in the chain: what if you receive a warrant from the US government? The SMTP server would be able to collect inbound/outbound emails in plaintext.
https://forwardemail.net/en/faq#do-you-support-openpgpmime-e...