A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
1–10 of 103 posts
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#2Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#3As a thought experiment, I wonder what happens when the FISA court orders Riot to install a modified version on a suspected terrorist's computer. No need for privilege escalation when you can just ask the user to install it at ring-0.
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#4Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#5Folks should build alternative clients for Riot's games. Riot has demonstrated that they should not be trusted to write clients.
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#6Folks should build alternative clients for Riot's games. Riot has demonstrated that they should not be trusted to write clients.
At that point, just make your own game, or easier yet, play another one.
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#7A user who installs a anti virus program wants that program to do its job and find bad actors. The virus on the other hand is completely unwanted by both the user and the software- Its existence is threatened by all fronts.
However, a anti-cheat lives in a extremely adversarial environment. The cheater (and the cheat) wants the cheat on its computer. As such, the user will be willing to do extra steps to assist the cheat. This makes the anti-cheat software in this case, the 'un-wanted' virus, so it has to exist in the most hostile of environments and somehow detect programs which have higher privileges than itself.
That said, Cheating is something that will not go away. Years and years ago, I developed with a friend of mine a completely undetectable cheat for all games on the HL2 platform. It involved a second computer, which man-in-the-middled all network data to the client computer. This second computer then would display a 'radar' of where enemies were. As the anti cheat would have no possible way of knowing the existence of this second computer, there was not much they could do.
If you wanted to get more aggressive with the system above, you could have that second computer modify outbound requests as well. So if you shoot your gun and it would have hit the ground, it will now instead shoot a enemy in the head- as such even something like a aimbot is entirely possible with this setup.
However, there is indeed a anti cheat which can detect all known cheats and its basically what Valve did/does for CS:GO - Allow users to report suspected cheaters and then have the community analyze the reports. This catches all blatant cheats, but unfortunately will never get rid of radar/esp cheaters, only aimbots and the like.
Honestly, it sounds to me like there is a business model in the above. Years ago we had companies like evenbalance/punkbuster, easy anticheat, etc.. which provided software based anti-cheat systems. As you would expect, most would by bypassed and a daily cat and mouse game would ensue. The solution imo is to create a SaaS where you essentially provide a reporting + monitoring tool. Users of your game can report suspected cheaters (which includes the demo file / vod / replay / whatever) and your trained wet-ware staff would review all reports and take action where necessary. No invasive software necessary. Actually, no software on the end users computer at all would be necessary- It is all done on another users PC.
In fact, if someone is interested in doing the above, hit me up. Sounds like a easy win.
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#8Explaining your rationale doesn't change the fact that gamers (many unwittingly) are potentially giving the keys to their computer kingdom to Riot. This behavior on a console would be completely acceptable but unless you're running a dedicated PC for gaming, I wouldn't install this software. As a thought experiment, I wonder what happens when the FISA court orders Riot to install a modified version on a suspected ter…
That's the approach I've been taking for a long time now.
If you don't, you will always a) have your fun ruined by trying to be security conscious b) in the end, most likely give in and allow things you really shouldn't allow on a trusted machine because otherwise you can't achieve your task (getting a game to run).
So I have a game box, try to make sure that nothing important ever touches it (which is a huge PITA when game clients insist on forcing email-based 2FA on you), but in exchange I don't worry too much about its security.
That also fits nicely with games requiring Windows 10 and Windows 10 being so outright privacy- and user-hostile that I can't imagine running it on my primary machine.
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#9If Valve can mitigate hacking in CSGO without such an intrusive service, I am sure Riot can. I, myself, did a very, very, very poor job with an autoencoder to detect anomalous matches in Dota and caught a large amount of players abusing the system. As far as I know, CSGO anti cheat does involve an ML component.
My point is that a non-intrusive anti cheat, advanced analytics, and tracking of user feedback goes a long way.
Ofc, none of this matters. If the playerbase actually cared, they'd boycott or stay away. And I cannot remember the last time gamers ran a successful boycott campaign.
edit: Also read that uninstalling the game will not always uninstall the ring 0 anti cheat. I can't verify since I would never install this on my system, but for what it is worth: That is terrible IF true.
Re: A Message About Vanguard From Our Security and Privacy Teams
#10The inherent issue with anti cheats as compared to anti-virus software is user intention. A user who installs a anti virus program wants that program to do its job and find bad actors. The virus on the other hand is completely unwanted by both the user and the software- Its existence is threatened by all fronts. However, a anti-cheat lives in a extremely adversarial environment. The cheater (and the cheat) wants the…
> It involved a second computer, which man-in-the-middled all network data to the client computer.
Out of interest, was there no transport level encryption to deal with here? Or did you need to do something special to capture keys on the client?