The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#2It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be.
Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems like the main implication someone would take away from that statement is that it's reasonably practical to describe mental processes with a computer but given that the question is formulated as a binary is/is-not. The mind "is" a Turing machine given ordinary physics which I believe say everything can be approximated by a large enough Turing machine. But this sense of "is" doesn't imply the Turing machine mind model is useful.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#3It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…
Your comment makes more sense if we replace “useful” with “practical”
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#4It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…
Nobody claims that Turing machines in particular are well-suited to the task. What we claim is something more open-ended: Turing-complete languages can simulate each other given a universal encoding (a program we typically call an "emulator") and the simulation is only polynomially slower and larger.
To the details: We don't want just one tape on the Turing machine. It's fine but slow, like using unary Church numerals instead of binary Cantor numerals. We usually assume at least two tapes. Similarly, we often ignore tapes and use a random-access memory instead.
Edit: I guess that this is how we're talking today? From the article:
> It is common to summarize CCTM through the slogan “the mind is a Turing machine”. This slogan is also somewhat misleading, because no one regards Turing’s precise formalism as a plausible model of mental activity. The formalism seems too restrictive in several ways.
The article then lists senses, finite memory, concurrency, and determinism as four ways in which the brain might differ from idealized Turing machines.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#5Please let me apologize for the lack of understanding, maybe someone can add to this: If biological intelligence works like a Turing machine, is it even possible to know what or how certain brain areas compute without simulating them bottom-up?
Question is influenced by this idea originally from the 80s: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#6It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…
Nobody claims that Turing machines in particular are well-suited to the task. What we claim is something more open-ended: Turing-complete languages can simulate each other given a universal encoding (a program we typically call an "emulator") and the simulation is only polynomially slower and larger. To the details: We don't want just one tape on the Turing machine. It's fine but slow, like using unary Church numeral…
Nobody claims that Turing machines in particular are well-suited to the task. What we claim is something more open-ended: Turing-complete languages can simulate each other given a universal encoding (a program we typically call an "emulator") and the simulation is only polynomially slower and larger.
Well, that's the Church-Turing Thesis, which most people accept but isn't being discussed by me or the OP - the topic being "theories of the mind", I think.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#7It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…
Nobody claims that Turing machines in particular are well-suited to the task. What we claim is something more open-ended: Turing-complete languages can simulate each other given a universal encoding (a program we typically call an "emulator") and the simulation is only polynomially slower and larger. To the details: We don't want just one tape on the Turing machine. It's fine but slow, like using unary Church numeral…
Finite memory just means a limited subset of what a Turing machine can do.
Concurrency doesn't make Turing computable processes capable of anything beyond what they can already do. At best it buys them speed, maybe some expressiveness for the programmer, and bugs.
Nondeterminism is useful for some algorithms but it also doesn't make it possible for Turing computable processes to go beyond Turing computability. See for example https://arxiv.org/pdf/cs/0401019.pdf.
The most interesting item in that list would be the senses of organisms, as some of those might indeed involve processes that are not computable.
Also, some aspects of the brain's activity may not be computable. See Roger Penrose's books for details, such as p. 377 of Shadows of the Mind (a section about possible noncomputability in some physical processes).
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#8Please let me apologize for the lack of understanding, maybe someone can add to this: If biological intelligence works like a Turing machine, is it even possible to know what or how certain brain areas compute without simulating them bottom-up? Question is influenced by this idea originally from the 80s: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility
>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine
We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to be true despite the steady advance of (computer) science.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#9It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…
I'm still reading through the paper/article, but a Turing machine would be the substrate in this case, not the model. I think the question is whether we can model the brain's way of computing in a Turing machine, and then it will follow we can also model the brain. Turing machines are a model of computation, and if the brain's computational model is Turing complete, it will follow that we can simulate a brain inside a Turing machine.
Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)
#10It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…
I think a Turing Machine is an infinite state automaton with the capability that you can remotely access state information. [1]
Maybe someone can clarify whether this is correct.
If you phrase it that way, then it seems more intuitive that the brain could be described as a Turing machine. The definition of a Turing machine is deceivingly simple and cause us to question what we perceive of as complex. The transition function (and the tape) actually make magic happen if you compare it to any "dumb" mechanical or electrical device.