The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
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Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#2I am myself skeptic of this. First of all - How does on control indeterminism?
And does QM indeterminism really play a role on a neuronal level? This paper by Tegmark argues it doesn't - https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9907009
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#3Can anyone dumb this down for me?
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#4I am myself skeptic of this. First of all - How does on control indeterminism? And does QM indeterminism really play a role on a neuronal level? This paper by Tegmark argues it doesn't - https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9907009
This seems to be a weak free will theorem: "Our provocative ascription of free will to elementary particles is deliberate, since our theorem asserts that if experimenters have a certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom." To me, they seem to be saying that the freedom of free will is a limited freedom from determinism, not the freedom of being able to choose a future.
The theory seems to be developed within the Copenhagen Interpretation framework of metaphysics, and I wonder if it is compatible with Many Worlds.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#5Can anyone dumb this down for me?
[deleted]
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#6I been juggling the following three papers for a bit and trying to brush my maths up. I don't know why I feel a hunch between them, but I do know that the hunch is to do with this problem.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.06824.pdf
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.0533.pdf
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.2779.pdf
I will almost certainly be wrong about whatever it is. However I may have more updates on how wrong and what it is I am wrong about, in maybe a decade or so ;)
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#7I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing.
If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. If my decisions are unpredictable given complete knowledge of my prior state, and the ability to extrapolate it forward, then the decisions do not come from me. If they're not mine, then I have no responsibility for them. Any discussion of my responsibility for my actions must take into account my personal contribution to the decision as a being.
Dualism does not solve this problem. It simply foists a chunk of a person's state into some non-material constituent, but if that constituent does not have a persistent (though presumably malleable) state or does not deterministically contribute to the process, again whence comes responsibility?
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#8Can anyone dumb this down for me?
> It asserts, roughly, that if
indeed we humans have free will, then elementary
particles already have their own small share of
this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the
experimenter can freely choose the directions
in which to orient his apparatus in a certain
measurement, then the particle’s response (to
be pedantic—the universe’s response near the
particle) is not determined by the entire previous
history of the universe.
That about sums it up. I think (and I could be very wrong) that the last sentence refers to a particle's lack of dependence on previous state; that for a measurement, only the present state will inform the measure.
That seems to infer something about the idea of 'free will', that is, 'free will' in this context seems to refer to an independence from prior states. Loosely, we can choose to step out of the path of our past's falling dominoes and change the course of our lives. Or something like that.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#9I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…
> The definition of 'me' is my prior state.
I don't think this is true. We know that thought and memory are constrained (accessed) at a physical level - at least to some extent. That is, damage to your physical brain can result in diminished or eliminated access to those things.
Indeed, thought as we know it seems to be a physically mediated process (perhaps not completely defined by our physical bodies, but at least influenced to some extent).
As well, emotion is a physically mediated phenomena. Even our experience of this existence is physically mediated. Without a functioning body we lack the ability to experience.
So what does that leave you to be? You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose.
You remember, but unless you choose, you are nothing but memory.
Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]
#10I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…
> “If my decisions are unpredictable given complete knowledge of my prior state, and the ability to extrapolate it forward, then the decisions do not come from me.”
I don’t see how that conclusion follows from that premise. In fact, the whole free will debate is uninteresting to me exactly because it seems like a dissolvable semantics question regarding what does “me” mean. Is it a totality of some prior physical state? Is it supernatural? Depending on what somebody arbitrarily chooses for that, it seems to more or less force a conclusion about free will. E.g. a supernaturalist might believe my decisions are fully determined by “me” but that “me” is a concept that partially exists outside of the applicability of physical laws.