Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
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Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
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Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#2Google sent me a nice email saying they had known what I did and should pay the money back. If I did it again or my account was caught in any kind of fraud it would be banned.
Cryptojacking is no different, it isn't some new hacking technique, it's not a new method or exploit, vulnerability or whatever you want to call it. Giving it a name like this gives it power and recognition and will let other "script kiddies" start using this when they infect the server with their gibberish.
Basically it's an rfi/lfi, but with their js miner instead of a "shell". I hope more researchers and enthusiests don't feed this, but they will, and it will be nothing but negative and draw a younger crowd into hacking (which could be good, since that seems to be how the industry draws in new 'good' researchers).
Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#3Would be a useful data point for a "tech stack" web crawler to monitor.
Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#4Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#5Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#6What percentage of mainstream sites use the "integrity" hash validation attribute when loading 3rd-party script for a known-good library version? Would be a useful data point for a "tech stack" web crawler to monitor.
Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#7Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#8when visiting the ICO website
That is... amusingly ironic.
Re: Protecting sites from Cryptojacking with CSP and SRI
#9Proof of stake will solve this.
No. It. Won't. The issue isn't PoW/PoS but the loading of infected code into browsers. PoS may stop the need for this particular JS code to get inserted. However, PoS will hinder no other JS from being inserted.