ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
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Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
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#4> Shortly after the researcher stated over social media that he would disclose a BIOS-level vulnerability in Lenovo products, Lenovo PSIRT made several unsuccessful attempts to collaborate with the researcher in advance of his publication of this information.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#5Starting with the X230 series of ThinkPads, Lenovo has used flash write protection to prevent "unauthorized" BIOS modifications. Owners of X220 laptops and below are able to reflash the BIOS to remove Lenovo's whitelist of WLAN/WWAN cards; the X230 models are currently stuck with Wi-Fi N and Gobi 3000 3G-only cards due to Lenovo's whitelist. Would this exploit allow ThinkPad owners to reflash their BIOS chip without…
The current exploit only runs far later, after the validation is performed. So unless you manage to mangle the code execution flow of the authentic firmware to the point that it skips the whitelists, you can't get rid of it.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
#6Really hope Lenovo respond soon. Feel like I should leave my ThinkPads hibernated for now.
In other words, while this could definitely make an attack more damaging and harder to remove, it doesn't seem like a reason to stop using a computer that has decent software and physical security.
Re: ThinkPwn: System Management Mode arbitrary code execution
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#10Really hope Lenovo respond soon. Feel like I should leave my ThinkPads hibernated for now.