"The service may not tolerate TLS interception."
I figured the proxy would be making the request entirely independently. How would an external entity even know the data was later being passed on?
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"The service may not tolerate TLS interception."
I figured the proxy would be making the request entirely independently. How would an external entity even know the data was later being passed on?
If I set NextDNS with DoT in my Android under the "private DNS" setting, and turn on the NextDNS setting with DNS rebinding protection, would the phone and some apps still find a way around it?
I also use NetGuard, but it's more cumbersome and doesn't allow DoT.
I fear that MITMing ads is a dead end: 1. IIUC, when SNI is encrypted (in TLS 1.3?) almost everything is out the window. 2. Local devices can do DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over QUIC (DoQ) to look up their stuff, so DNS-based blocking will soon be obsolete. 3. The browser itself is controlled by the biggest ad-vendor around (Google), so you’ll probably get no help there. The only solutions are: A. Use browsers not c…
D. Create a whole bunch of VMs with browsers and “fake users” to DoS the whole ad-based business model.
Or perhaps forget about VMs, and have some kind of browser plugin that performs "fake browsing" - to throw off analytics - with your real cookies, but hidden from view, so it's not annoying to the live user browsing the web in the usual manner.
I fear that MITMing ads is a dead end: 1. IIUC, when SNI is encrypted (in TLS 1.3?) almost everything is out the window. 2. Local devices can do DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over QUIC (DoQ) to look up their stuff, so DNS-based blocking will soon be obsolete. 3. The browser itself is controlled by the biggest ad-vendor around (Google), so you’ll probably get no help there. The only solutions are: A. Use browsers not c…
https://kb.adguard.com/en/general/how-malware-protection-wor...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
OP is stating that "apps and devices" may circumvent DNS blocking by resorting to DoH. You can run your own DoH server, and you can even advertise it via your DHCP server, but clients ("apps and devices") do not need to accept the supplied servers for their own configuration.
A lot of things are possible, but are they done? I am yet to hear of any examples of hardcoded DNS servers. I believe this to be too fragile to implement.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
A lot of things are possible, but are they done? I am yet to hear of any examples of hardcoded DNS servers. I believe this to be too fragile to implement.
League of Legends hardcodes 8.8.8.8.
I fear that MITMing ads is a dead end: 1. IIUC, when SNI is encrypted (in TLS 1.3?) almost everything is out the window. 2. Local devices can do DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over QUIC (DoQ) to look up their stuff, so DNS-based blocking will soon be obsolete. 3. The browser itself is controlled by the biggest ad-vendor around (Google), so you’ll probably get no help there. The only solutions are: A. Use browsers not c…
What does it mean when: "The service may not tolerate TLS interception." I figured the proxy would be making the request entirely independently. How would an external entity even know the data was later being passed on?
This remote interception then involves turning a CONNECT back into the classic proxy connection. First a TLS session from your client to the proxy, then a TLS session from the proxy to the real endpoint.
The proxy needs to present itself to the client as valid for the real endpoint of the TLS connection. This is usually done by adding your own CA into the clients trust so you can sign any certificates required for the client -> proxy half. As you note, the connection from proxy -> endpoint is normally the easy part of that as it works like a normal client.
Two examples of not "tolerating" that interception are certificate pinning and client certificates.
Certificate pinning - The client validates extra information about the presented certificate beyond CA trust. Usually the x509 SHA-256 digest presented to the client. In this case the external entity doesn't enforce anything, you could modify the client to work.
Client certificates - Client cert authentication includes verification of the server certificate, so the forged proxy certificate will not be valid for the client cert. They are a pair. This would require a forged client cert for client -> proxy. Then the real client cert for proxy -> endpoint half.
So it's more convincing the client to tolerate the interception rather than the external endpoint.
Some people seem to be saying that apps and devices bypass your DNS settings. If I set NextDNS with DoT in my Android under the "private DNS" setting, and turn on the NextDNS setting with DNS rebinding protection, would the phone and some apps still find a way around it? I also use NetGuard, but it's more cumbersome and doesn't allow DoT.
Chromium contains its own DNS resolver so connects directly to a DNS server rather than use the OS, but it would normally default to your OS settings (and only use DoH when they find a matching entry in their list of DoH providers).
Desktop Firefox is an example of an app that defaults to DoH from 1.1.1.1 (in some places).
Earlier quoted context omitted.
OP is stating that "apps and devices" may circumvent DNS blocking by resorting to DoH. You can run your own DoH server, and you can even advertise it via your DHCP server, but clients ("apps and devices") do not need to accept the supplied servers for their own configuration.
A lot of things are possible, but are they done? I am yet to hear of any examples of hardcoded DNS servers. I believe this to be too fragile to implement.