Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do you do that if you only control one end?
Asymmetric encryption? Both you (the human) and the agent publish public keys, the agent sign/encrypt the OTP request with you public key, you verify/decrypt using your private key, then do the same the other way to send the OTP (always encrypted though, given you’re sending a secret). Something like that?
Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
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Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#22Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#23Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#24We are creating a future we wouldn't want to live in.
Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#25Not looking forward to a dehumanized internet where that’s mainstream… agents are tools to support humans, here you’re helping them impersonating humans. That feels pretty terrible to be honest > The internet was made for humans exclusively, designed to keep machines out by default. I don’t buy that at all. APIs exist to enable “machines” to interact with services
In principle this tool allows the owner of a website to block this domain entirely. Although I’m not sure the incentives are really aligned.
In the future, it's likely the open Internet will be 99.99% robots. It's already > 50% robots. The government ID system a lot of countries are adopting to keep teenagers off of social media would also serve to both help control for non-human spam, and also control the network period. It's also possible a private system of human-verification certificates may come up to meet the demand like Apple ID with biometrics. Could also be the liveness tests KYC companies use may be more popular.
Discussed previously here: https://meatballwiki.org/wiki/GovernmentBackedAuthentication
Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#26Not looking forward to a dehumanized internet where that’s mainstream… agents are tools to support humans, here you’re helping them impersonating humans. That feels pretty terrible to be honest > The internet was made for humans exclusively, designed to keep machines out by default. I don’t buy that at all. APIs exist to enable “machines” to interact with services
Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#27I've already received spam email from AI agents using a seeming competitor to this (agentmail.to) and then claiming they aren't AI agents and then trying to sell me garbage. I can't tell you how much I hate this.
Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
Asymmetric encryption? Both you (the human) and the agent publish public keys, the agent sign/encrypt the OTP request with you public key, you verify/decrypt using your private key, then do the same the other way to send the OTP (always encrypted though, given you’re sending a secret). Something like that?
But that doesn't help for the agent receiving mail from arbitrary 3rd parties
Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#29I've already received spam email from AI agents using a seeming competitor to this (agentmail.to) and then claiming they aren't AI agents and then trying to sell me garbage. I can't tell you how much I hate this.
Now that I think about it I’m pretty sure that’s illegal in Germany under UWG §7 (which is insanely strict, to a fault, but is helpful here). And maybe in other parts of the EU under ePrivacy laws
Re: Show HN: Agent.email – sign up via curl, claim with a human OTP
#30 From: Kushal
Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 05:03:11 +0000
Saw your question on the Agent Vault thread about websocket-frame auth
(Home Assistant) and the worry about the model reflecting the bearer
token back into its own context.
chrome-relay's answer is structurally different: the credential never
enters the agent's context because the agent never touches it — the HA
session lives in your real Chrome (cookies, WS handshake and all), and
the agent drives the tab over CDP, only ever seeing the rendered page.
URL: https://chrome-relay.kushalsm.com/
For your HA + agent setup today, are you keeping the session alive in a
browser the agent attaches to, or doing the WS auth on the agent side
and managing the token-in-context risk yourself?
Kushal
Read to me like an LLM had written it. It references something I said in a HN comment, but it was clearly just an excuse to spamvertise their product.I looked at the headers and it contained a List-Unsubscribe header pointing to https://api.agentmail.to
So basically somebody wrote a bot to scrape HN for comments related to some software they wanted to push and send targetted spam. agentmail.to is a Ycombinator funded email service for LLMs which can be, and is, used to send targetted spam and impersonate people. They could mostly solve this problem by adding a block of text to every email expaining an "AI" wrote it. They'd lose customers doing that though of course. I reported this abuse but haven't (and don't expect to) received a response.
I don't even get the point anyway. You can get Claude using an SMTP or IMAP server in seconds.