The only thing in this protocol that prevents the reuse of Authorization header is keeping track of nonce: > Validating that the nonce has not been used already for this session. Important: at this point, the nonce should be added to the ‘seen’ set, because nonces should be invalidated whether the signature validation passes or fails. Failure to do so can allow attackers to brute-force a valid signature for a single…
Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
21–30 of 113 posts
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#22The only thing in this protocol that prevents the reuse of Authorization header is keeping track of nonce: > Validating that the nonce has not been used already for this session. Important: at this point, the nonce should be added to the ‘seen’ set, because nonces should be invalidated whether the signature validation passes or fails. Failure to do so can allow attackers to brute-force a valid signature for a single…
Timestamps can be vulnerable to clock attacks, right? Why not just include a monotonically increasing request number along with the nonce in each request?
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#23The only thing in this protocol that prevents the reuse of Authorization header is keeping track of nonce: > Validating that the nonce has not been used already for this session. Important: at this point, the nonce should be added to the ‘seen’ set, because nonces should be invalidated whether the signature validation passes or fails. Failure to do so can allow attackers to brute-force a valid signature for a single…
I thought I was misreading this. It seems onerous to keep track of every nonce, even scoped to a given session. Maybe I’m missing something.
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#24Right; but with WebSession, if someone steals the client keypair (and generated shared secret), they can impersonate you just as easily. Why would this be any more secure against that?
Cookies aren't perfect, for sure, but I don't think this solves it.
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#25It’s also very common that a website wants credentials to be cleared when the user is inactive for a certain amount of time. This is important for sensitive applications such as banking and healthcare. Currently there’s no way to enforce that a cookie is cleared on device lock or user inactivity, especially because security requires that such cookies not be visible to JavaScript. A native session management solution…
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#26>>>If someone steals this cookie, they can impersonate you. Right; but with WebSession, if someone steals the client keypair (and generated shared secret), they can impersonate you just as easily. Why would this be any more secure against that? Cookies aren't perfect, for sure, but I don't think this solves it.
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#27> As a result of increasingly strict privacy laws across the world, users are now beset with cookie banners across the Web
In the words of a law prof from the Radboud University, more accurate is to say "as a result of an entire industry colluding to undermine legislation".
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#28I’d like to understand the threat model under which this is supposed to be superior to a bearer token stored in a heavily restricted (__Host- prefixed, Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax) cookie. Neither can be exfiltrated by JavaScript so they’re in pretty much the same spot as far as XSS is concerned. Both can be captured if the user agent is compromised so there’s no difference there AFAICT. Is interception of traffic…
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#29The only real advantage I see here is having a dedicated storage for session identifiers as opposed to clubbing it with other non-essential cookies. Everything else in the proposal isn't really required. Considering this, simply choosing a standard name for session cookies suffices. Browsers can give an option to the user to rejects all cookies that don't have the name "WebSession". This is already achievable using e…
Re: Show HN: WebSession, a Secure Replacement for Cookies
#30From the article: > As a result of increasingly strict privacy laws across the world, users are now beset with cookie banners across the Web In the words of a law prof from the Radboud University, more accurate is to say "as a result of an entire industry colluding to undermine legislation".
Asking for a friend: Is the the European Parliament also a part of the industry colluding to undermine legislation?