This is neat, but I'm not convinced it's going in the right direction.
It's not open source, and "maybe it will eventually be" is unacceptable for such a core component of an engineer's workflow. Most of the features on the front page are "coming soon," not actually available. There's no timeline for support for non-Mac OS systems, and it's built using Metal rather than any cross-platform API, so it will be at least moderately difficult to port. (Isn't the whole point collaboration?) It is "blazingly-fast" but has no benchmarks for latency or startup time.
The team raised money because "[b]uilding a terminal is hard," and the business model seems reasonable - build a terminal people like, and then get businesses to pay for it - but I'm hard-pressed to find a use case that would benefit from the upsides of this tool which isn't also utterly hamstrung by its shortcomings, at least currently.
Yeah, maybe you can justify it at an all-Mac dev shop, but at the last all-Mac place I worked we did everything this currently does with iTerm (free) and Tuple, and frankly I don't see this obviating the need for Tuple in that use case. (EDIT: Tuple also works fine on Linux, and of course there are myriad excellent terminals for Linux.)
Perhaps most importantly, though, this FAQ entry concerns me:
> Every session you work on your desktop can be backed by a secure web permalink. It opens into a browser tab that shows your terminal state and allows readers to scroll and interact with the read-only elements. You might use this for yourself: so you can view and run commands on it while you're away from your machine. Or you might share it with a coworker for debugging.
First of all, is this actually available at the moment? I think not, since "Web (WASM)" is still on the roadmap.
Second, "secure" is doing a lot of work here. What's the threat model Warp considers themselves secure against? How are these sessions allocated? Does every terminal start in a connected state, or is the connection only made once the user opts in? Are the terminal sessions E2EE? Are they exposed to Warp's internal systems? If so, what is stopping any attacker who makes it into Warp's network from remotely monitoring and controlling user machines? If Warp says it _is_ E2EE or otherwise secured in this manner, how can we trust them when it's not open source?
This seems too risky to be worth using seriously, and perhaps too risky to even try out.