Earlier quoted context omitted.
How about the term "unauthenticated", which is well understood for HTTP requests?
Well, IMO the definition of the word "anonymous" still fits how personal information is handled in Briefing: "Anonymity describes situations where the acting person's name is unknown" [1] And this is true regarding the Briefing service. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymity
Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
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Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#22Using firefox 79, the usual prompts to allow permissions were not issued.
Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#23"No camera or microphone has been found!" Using firefox 79, the usual prompts to allow permissions were not issued.
Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
By using the term "anonymous" I wanted to say, that no user account is required. To hide one self's identity and network location I would expect the users to make use of browsers like Tor or using VPN. I don't know of any way to provide anonymity on web application level. If somebody knows more, please let me know.
How about the term "unauthenticated", which is well understood for HTTP requests?
> Anonymous User is any user who accesses network resources without providing a username or password.
Se anonymous is correct in this context
Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This outer layer of DTLS-SRTP encryption is removed while packets are traversing Jitsi Videobridge What this means is that the packets are encrypted between you and the video bridge and the packets travel unencrypted within the videobridge infrastructure, but at no point does the outside world see the unencrypted stream. Talking to the Jitsi video bridge is just a regular WebRTC session as far as clients are concer…
Thanks for the feedback, I'll take Olm/Matrix and Signal into consideration, although I believe for the described purpose of Briefing the current implementation is sufficient and secure.
edit: it looks like you can find info in the RTCSessionDescription.sdp property. The remoteDescription and localDescription should each have key fingerprints in lines with "a=fingerprint:..."
Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#26Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#27How can we further decentralize this such that the entire app runs "without any servers"? Sadly it is so close but the realities of ipv4 and local subnets definitely makes this more difficult. I always thought that this is part of what webrtc was trying to solve
Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#28Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#29How can we further decentralize this such that the entire app runs "without any servers"? Sadly it is so close but the realities of ipv4 and local subnets definitely makes this more difficult. I always thought that this is part of what webrtc was trying to solve
With Squawk[1] we do the initial signaling through our own servers via websocket, and a key registry for authing peers to each other, but after that, all the fun stuff happens p2p. The protocol level data (who's speaking, which group they're speaking to, whether they are muted, etc) flows entirely p2p over data channels, and since we're audio only we made the decision not to use SFUs but rather do a full mesh architecture (massive PITA but it does scale well to 20-30 peers) with geo-optimized TURN servers when people need to punch through NAT (but TURN does not terminate ssl).
Re: Show HN: Briefing – Anonymous, secure, open source WebRTC group video chat
#30I don't understand the anonymous claim. Since in WebRTC peers connect directly to each other they'll see the IP of the other peer and can determine their locations. Further there is the signalling server which may also see these connection details if it isn't end to end encrypted (I haven't checked the code). IMHO private might be a better word than anonymous here.
By using the term "anonymous" I wanted to say, that no user account is required. To hide one self's identity and network location I would expect the users to make use of browsers like Tor or using VPN. I don't know of any way to provide anonymity on web application level. If somebody knows more, please let me know.
A more descriptive term would be "account-free".