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Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

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Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#21

Post by sarciszewski »

jchrisa wrote: post #20
mschultheiss wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1. The web crypto api was indeed made to secure communications, such as stated by the W3C on http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/ (...) "Uses for this API range from user or service authentication, document or code signing, and the confidentiality and integrity of communications. " 2. Yes, you are definetly right, an detailed audit of the protocol is necessary by more than one expert. 3. Here is a short description of…

It seems like there would be a lot of uses for something like a jQuery for the WebCrypto API. There are enough ways to get it wrong, and enough commonality among 80% use cases, I can see something like this being better than the alternative.

WebCrypto is a potluck of popular cryptography standards, chosen by committee.

What you want instead is a library that carefully selects primitives with an emphasis on:

    1. Security
    2. Performance
    3. Ease of use
You want a high-level API, like I'm building for PHP 7.1, not a low-level API, like openssl, mcrypt, WebCrypto, etc.

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#22

Post by sarciszewski »

https://github.com/mschultheiss/Charme/blob/7634cd89febbe288...

Please see:

https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/07/how-safely-generate-rando...

--------------

https://github.com/mschultheiss/Charme/blob/c8eb501f1ac0c607...

https://github.com/mschultheiss/Charme/blob/7634cd89febbe288...

please see:

http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/

https://hynek.me/articles/storing-passwords/

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#24

Post by joe_the_user »

beatpanda wrote: post #3

I want this to work so much. So many people have tried this, and I have signed up for, or self-hosted, every single one of these things, and even convinced my friends to join a few. None of them ever take off. How is this different?

Yes, this.

It seems like there are far more programmers creating back-end for this kind of thing than there are designers working on good concepts and front-ends.

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#25

Post by mehrdada »

tptacek wrote: post #9

The cryptography in this system does not appear to be safe. Apart from the fact that it's browser Javascript, which can only be as secure as the server's verified TLS key anyways (and thus doesn't add any security TLS doesn't), it's also using outdated RSA crypto constructions that are vulnerable to attacks. I think you should find an expert to work on this project with you and provide the cryptographic design for yo…

> browser Javascript, which can only be as secure as the server's verified TLS key anyways (and thus doesn't add any security TLS doesn't)

This is not precise. While it does not stop even the most basic active attackers, it does prevent passive logging on the server without changing the served JavaScript, therefore making undetectable mass surveillance on the server harder. The effect is analogous to the difference between TLS with and without forward secrecy: with a similar argument you could conclude ephemeral DH/ECDH does not add any security to TLS, which is not quite the case.

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#26

Post by sarciszewski »

mehrdada wrote: post #25
tptacek wrote: post #9

The cryptography in this system does not appear to be safe. Apart from the fact that it's browser Javascript, which can only be as secure as the server's verified TLS key anyways (and thus doesn't add any security TLS doesn't), it's also using outdated RSA crypto constructions that are vulnerable to attacks. I think you should find an expert to work on this project with you and provide the cryptographic design for yo…

> browser Javascript, which can only be as secure as the server's verified TLS key anyways (and thus doesn't add any security TLS doesn't) This is not precise. While it does not stop even the most basic active attackers, it does prevent passive logging on the server without changing the served JavaScript, therefore making undetectable mass surveillance on the server harder. The effect is analogous to the difference b…

> While it does not stop even the most basic active attackers

You just admitted that it's useless!

https://adamcaudill.com/2014/02/25/on-opportunistic-encrypti...

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#27

Post by mehrdada »

sarciszewski wrote: post #26
mehrdada wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> browser Javascript, which can only be as secure as the server's verified TLS key anyways (and thus doesn't add any security TLS doesn't) This is not precise. While it does not stop even the most basic active attackers, it does prevent passive logging on the server without changing the served JavaScript, therefore making undetectable mass surveillance on the server harder. The effect is analogous to the difference b…

> While it does not stop even the most basic active attackers You just admitted that it's useless! https://adamcaudill.com/2014/02/25/on-opportunistic-encrypti...

> You just admitted that it's useless!

No, I do not believe stopping passive attacks is useless.

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#28

Post by sarciszewski »

mehrdada wrote: post #27
sarciszewski wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> While it does not stop even the most basic active attackers You just admitted that it's useless! https://adamcaudill.com/2014/02/25/on-opportunistic-encrypti...

> You just admitted that it's useless! No, I do not believe stopping passive attacks is useless.

When you stop passive attacks, then attackers will just step up their game to active attacks.

If you want to call something secure, you need to design a threat model that doesn't involve an attacker with one arm tied behind their back. That doesn't serve anyone's interests, except maybe the blackhats'.

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#29

Post by mehrdada »

sarciszewski wrote: post #28
mehrdada wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You just admitted that it's useless! No, I do not believe stopping passive attacks is useless.

When you stop passive attacks, then attackers will just step up their game to active attacks. If you want to call something secure, you need to design a threat model that doesn't involve an attacker with one arm tied behind their back. That doesn't serve anyone's interests, except maybe the blackhats'.

> When you stop passive attacks, then attackers will just step up their game to active attacks.

Not always. It often changes the economics of the game. Especially when facing mass surveillance, considering the potential risk of detectability. Just because some attackers can step up their game for some targets, it does not imply they will do the same for all targets.

> If you want to call something secure...

I don't disagree with your point of view about what can or cannot be called "secure". One can debate that definition. However, stopping passive attackers is often NOT useless and it does add value. Security is not a binary proposition.

Re: Show HN: A decentralized social network with end-to-end encryption

#30

Post by sarciszewski »

mehrdada wrote: post #29
sarciszewski wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When you stop passive attacks, then attackers will just step up their game to active attacks. If you want to call something secure, you need to design a threat model that doesn't involve an attacker with one arm tied behind their back. That doesn't serve anyone's interests, except maybe the blackhats'.

> When you stop passive attacks, then attackers will just step up their game to active attacks. Not always. It often changes the economics of the game. Especially when facing mass surveillance, considering the potential risk of detectability. Just because some attackers can step up their game for some targets, it does not imply they will do the same for all targets. > If you want to call something secure... I don't d…

Sure, but consider this:

Do you know what stops all passive attackers and most active attackers? TLS.

Do you know what WebCrypto adds that TLS doesn't? Nothing.

That's why this is useless. Just use TLS correctly and you're better off.

Now, reframe this as "desktop application that uses libsodium in a protocol designed by cryptography engineer" and suddenly my interest is piqued.

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