161–170 of 227 posts
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Is the private key still worth something if the attacker has access to the server?
Yes, because the key is still private. Any other machine to witch you can login with that private key is still off limites.
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* Every application on the phone is sandboxed. * The disk is encrypted by default, and the OS is aggressive about keeping it encrypted ; a booted-up computer is almost always decrypted. * The language runtimes on the phone are hardened. * The phone's kernel, in addition to being more important attack surface than the Linux kernel (because of the jailbreak market, among other things), is auto-updated. * The phone's us…
So if I buy such a phone, what is the relationship between the baseband chip/OS and all the bullet points you listed above? https://www.fsf.org/blogs/community/replicant-developers-fin... It's a real pain, but I can buy a laptop/desktop that doesn't have Intel ME (or its AMD equivalent) running on it. But there's no such thing as a working phone without a baseband OS. And AFAICT there isn't a single available baseban…
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For one of the main repos: https://github.com/KryptCo/kr 57% Go 40% Rust First time I've seen them paired together in the wild like this, very cool!
Thanks! We love Go for its SSH support and Rust for its dylib / crypto libraries.
Nice idea, but only if the phone was a platform you could trust.
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What's cheaper - an iOS phone, or an Android phone + a Yubikey?
Tptacek is telling you that the most secure phone is iOS. If what's most important to you is price (and, therefore not security), yeah, you might find something else to be more compelling. That fact your different value system leads to a different choice has no relevance to the discussion. If your assumption is that Android + yubikey is as good as iOS, you need to state that. Tptacek disagrees with that elsewhere in…
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I don't think OS X's sandboxing has seen nearly as much scrutiny as the iOS/Android counterparts. An OS X sandbox escape buys you barely anything since the vast majority of apps don't come form the Mac App Store and don't bother enabling it. I wouldn't put a whole lot of faith in it.
Vast majority? Well, for the Hacker News audience, sure :) But the App Store is popular enough for Apple to require a checkbox in the settings for installing outside apps, like on Android.
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Erm, not true - changing the Yubikey setting to require a touch for key use (S/C/E) is trivial. Malware can't use it without restriction if it requires you to physically touch it every time you want to approve use.
Point taken. Unfortunately when you touch the key you still can't verify exactly what you are approving.
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Vast majority? Well, for the Hacker News audience, sure :) But the App Store is popular enough for Apple to require a checkbox in the settings for installing outside apps, like on Android.
You're confusing the App Store and Gatekeeper. If you register for Apple's developer program they'll issue you a certificate that you can use to sign and distribute your applications outside the App Store, with no input or restrictions from Apple, while bypassing that checkbox. These applications are the majority that aren't required to be sandboxed, and rarely are.
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Respectfully, this is easy: get a better phone and turn autoupdate on.
Also respectfully, he stated patched daily. Generally, security updates for both iOS and Android devices happen in a monthly roll-up. If your checklist for being "secure" involves being up-to-date, there is no amount of 'getting a better phone' that will put it on par with a desktop OS that receives daily patches.
Hey HN! We've built a way to generate an SSH key on your phone and use it from your computer such that the private key never leaves the phone. We were inspired by the threat model of USB HSMs like the Yubikey and set out to build a free, public source, and easier to use BYOD alternative. Looking forward to your questions!
license :( this exact thing is on my devs teams backlog. if you figure out a good license it would be AMAZING for us.
The MuPDF app is available under AGPLv3+. https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/mupdf/id482941798?mt=8
You will catch some flak for discouraging free commercial re-use.
If you see your app or portions of it as more of a library for others to use then LGPL is an option that requires reciprocity. In an unusual case, a "lax" license was recommended for the reference Ogg/Vorbis audio codec implementation: https://lwn.net/2001/0301/a/rms-ov-license.php3
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* Every application on the phone is sandboxed. * The disk is encrypted by default, and the OS is aggressive about keeping it encrypted ; a booted-up computer is almost always decrypted. * The language runtimes on the phone are hardened. * The phone's kernel, in addition to being more important attack surface than the Linux kernel (because of the jailbreak market, among other things), is auto-updated. * The phone's us…
>> Every application on the phone is sandboxed Note that you are trusting this app with your private key. While other apps are sandboxed away from having access, all it takes is one update to the app to sneak away your private key to any remote server. You have to trust the publisher of this app, including their entire chain of source code repository management and app build/release process. It takes a single instanc…
Fair point, not really applicable in this case though. It looks like everything you'll need you can find on their GitHub https://github.com/kryptco yourself.
Which means, you could check/skim the code strange "phoning-home calls" and get rid of them in your own fork. It would be nice to have some security experts doing some code review :)
> Also likely to be less devastating of a loss compared to the compromise of the contents of a password manager.
I often compare this situation like when you've lost your actual keys/keychain. The person who find your key's needs to figure out where to use them (if you don't store the address with your key's you're kind of fine).. If someone find my private keys, github is something I would worry about the most. The good thing is you can add a passphrase to you ssh keys (something you can't do with your "real" / physical keys ;) )