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Show HN: Run your own OAuth2 and OpenID Connect Provider

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Re: Show HN: Run your own OAuth2 and OpenID Connect Provider

#11
post #4

Is OAuth2 back in the good graces of the dev community? I thought one of its creators considered it a dead standard? https://hueniverse.com/2012/07/26/oauth-2-0-and-the-road-to-... (Genuinely asking because I've been thinking I might use a centralized auth store in a project recently and I wondered what the state of the art was.)

also noteworthy that the blog post is 4 years old and OAuth2 is basically everywhere :)

Also noteworthy that adoption doesn't change any of the points made.

Re: Show HN: Run your own OAuth2 and OpenID Connect Provider

#13
post #9
post #6

> OAuth2 and OAuth2 related specifications are over 200 written pages. Implementing OAuth2 is easy, getting it right is hard. Well that is not true or to tell it differently it's true and false. This sentence implies that somebody will want to implement everything from OAuth2 which basically doesn't need to happen in your own Application. I mean most people should probably never built their own, however the OAauth2 R…

I think I agree, although I'd like to point out a few things. 1) Just like any other authentication/security system, probably not a good idea to write your own for production. As a learning experience, definitely. 2) The spec is pretty good, although it's a little confusing that it's more or less split across https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749 (oauth) and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750 (bearer tokens) 3) The ha…

I agree 100% on number (3), especially because almost nobody knows https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819 (OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations)

Re: Show HN: Run your own OAuth2 and OpenID Connect Provider

#14
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

also noteworthy that the blog post is 4 years old and OAuth2 is basically everywhere :)

Also noteworthy that adoption doesn't change any of the points made.

adoption doesn't change the points semantically, but it shows that a large part of the (corporate) secrutiy community weighs those arguments (much) less than the author does.
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