Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
1–10 of 28 posts
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#2Hi all!
This is my first time posting something to HN, so please be kind.
I wanted to show what I’ve been working on for the last 6 months:
NoKey, a password manager without a master password. Instead, you can unlock your passwords by confirming from another device. E.g. if you need a password on your PC, you only have to confirm this on your phone. No need to remember any passwords!
The vast majority of the code is written in Elm and it’s fully open source.
There is a browser extension for Chrome and Firefox and an Android app. The application is only useful with at least two devices, so to really test it out, you’ll have to install it on two devices. There is no iOS version and the web app doesn’t work on Safari either (it's missing some stuff from the Web Crypto API), sorry!
Any feedback or questions are greatly appreciated!
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#3Seems like a good idea. What happens when I lose both my devices?
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#4Seems like a good idea. What happens when I lose both my devices?
You lose access to your passwords, that's the consequence of that approach.
That's why it's a very good idea to pair as many devices as you can, e.g. an old phone, your work PC, etc.
This way you're pretty save from any loss.
In general, if you save your passwords with security level N (meaning you need N devices to unlock), if you lose all but N-1 devices, you lose access. You can also add a "key box", which gives you one more "device", but requires you to remember a password.
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#5I like the Correct Horse Battery Staple approach to the pairing mechanism ;-)
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#6Seems like a good idea. What happens when I lose both my devices?
You lose access to your passwords, that's the consequence of that approach. That's why it's a very good idea to pair as many devices as you can, e.g. an old phone, your work PC, etc. This way you're pretty save from any loss. In general, if you save your passwords with security level N (meaning you need N devices to unlock), if you lose all but N-1 devices, you lose access. You can also add a "key box", which gives y…
> That's why it's a very good idea to pair as many devices as you can
Doesn't this increase your attack surface greatly though? The more devices you have this on, the greater chances that one or more of them could be compromised and used to access your passwords. Since there's no master key, one has to only compromise the OS to get at everything. Given that so many devices do not receive regular security updates, this seems like it would be a concern..
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
You lose access to your passwords, that's the consequence of that approach. That's why it's a very good idea to pair as many devices as you can, e.g. an old phone, your work PC, etc. This way you're pretty save from any loss. In general, if you save your passwords with security level N (meaning you need N devices to unlock), if you lose all but N-1 devices, you lose access. You can also add a "key box", which gives y…
> That's why it's a very good idea to pair as many devices as you can Doesn't this increase your attack surface greatly though? The more devices you have this on, the greater chances that one or more of them could be compromised and used to access your passwords. Since there's no master key, one has to only compromise the OS to get at everything. Given that so many devices do not receive regular security updates, thi…
> Doesn't this increase your attack surface greatly though?
That's true. I suppose it's a trade off between protection against lost vs. smaller attack surface.
> Since there's no master key, one has to only compromise the OS to get at everything
That's wrong, compromising one device doesn't give an attacker anything useful. Only if two or more devices have been compromised can passwords be decrypted. But in any case, I think if your device is compromised you might be in bigger troubles anyway. E.g. if an attacker controls your device, ransomeware might be easier and more lucrative to them than going after more devices to hunt for passwords.
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#8Earlier quoted context omitted.
> That's why it's a very good idea to pair as many devices as you can Doesn't this increase your attack surface greatly though? The more devices you have this on, the greater chances that one or more of them could be compromised and used to access your passwords. Since there's no master key, one has to only compromise the OS to get at everything. Given that so many devices do not receive regular security updates, thi…
> Doesn't this increase your attack surface greatly though? That's true. I suppose it's a trade off between protection against lost vs. smaller attack surface. > Since there's no master key, one has to only compromise the OS to get at everything That's wrong, compromising one device doesn't give an attacker anything useful. Only if two or more devices have been compromised can passwords be decrypted. But in any case,…
> That's wrong, compromising one device doesn't give an attacker anything useful
Yea I understand that, but by having a large number of devices with this on it, you increase the chances that any two of them could be compromised. That was my point, I just didn't articulate it well enough.
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#9I like the Correct Horse Battery Staple approach to the pairing mechanism ;-)
Thanks. I was always wondering why others don't do this more often.
I find it much easier to remember and type in a few words compared to a long number.
Re: Show HN: NoKey, a Distributed Password Manager Without a Master Password
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Doesn't this increase your attack surface greatly though? That's true. I suppose it's a trade off between protection against lost vs. smaller attack surface. > Since there's no master key, one has to only compromise the OS to get at everything That's wrong, compromising one device doesn't give an attacker anything useful. Only if two or more devices have been compromised can passwords be decrypted. But in any case,…
> That's wrong, compromising one device doesn't give an attacker anything useful Yea I understand that, but by having a large number of devices with this on it, you increase the chances that any two of them could be compromised. That was my point, I just didn't articulate it well enough.
Oh, than I misunderstood, sorry. You're absolutely correct.