Earlier quoted context omitted.
Got a reference for this? My understanding is Nash equilibrium exists in any game with finite states, regardless of perfect or imperfect information. The bit about announcing your strategy holds by definition - the equilibrium is defined such that no player can improve, thus it doesn't matter if the other player's strategy is known. Also, I don't think there's a requirement that Nash strategies be reachable by iterat…
Everything you said about Nash equilibrium is true, I didn't mean to imply that it can only be found in perfect information games via iteration. What I wanted to say is that methods for finding it via iteration and self-play exist and are well defined but only for perfect information games. The research itself is here: https://ai.facebook.com/blog/rebel-a-general-game-playing-ai...
Re: Ask HN: Solving problems by mapping to other problems that we know how to solve
#81Hey just wanted to say thanks for sharing this.