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Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

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Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#731
(I also submitted this as an Express Comment in the proceeding. If you agree, consider also filing a comment.)

A lot of issues around IoT device security are hard, but there is one simple and easy piece of policy that would be a big win:

Make the requirements stricter if the product contains a microphone than if it doesn't.

Some device makers are putting microphones into devices that don't need them, to support functionality that isn't useful, just because microphones are cheap. For example, TCL (a Chinese television brand) puts microphones into its remote controls. They do this because while most people don't want to control devices by voice, a few people do, and microphones are very cheap. This is a problem because anything with a microphone in it is a valuable target for hackers; compromising a TV remote with a microphone is _useful_ to them, in ways the compromising eg a wifi-connected clothes dryer would not be. If adding a microphone to a device created additional legal requirements, vendors would stop putting them in places where they lack a legitimate purpose, and there would be fewer insecure microphones floating around.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#732

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> There is an inherent risk of your vulnerabilities being broadcasted somewhere either on purpose or accidentally once that information is collected and organized by the researcher. A legitimate researcher is going to promptly notify you of any vulnerabilities they discover and you as a large organization are going to promptly remediate them. But the trouble isn't that the law might impose a $100 fine on a smug profe…

I agree the laws are too broad. I think we need add layers of granularity to them. Create more of a framework for settling the rules on what is and isn't allowed. Maybe we settle on everything goes, but the company should be involved. A legitimate researcher should be notifying the company that they are going to be looking for vulnerabilities in the first place. That is part of the distinction in behavior that I am e…

> A legitimate researcher should be notifying the company that they are going to be looking for vulnerabilities in the first place. That is part of the distinction in behavior that I am encouraging. This way if someone is caught poking around for things to abuse unsolicited, at least there's a little more merit to holding them accountable. We are able to treat it more like the threat it is.

The issue is this. You have some amateur, some hobbyist, who knows enough to spot a vulnerability, but isn't a professional security researcher and isn't a lawyer. They say "that's weird, there's no way...," so they attempt the exploit on a lark, and it works.

This person is not a dangerous felon and should not be facing felony charges. They deserve a slap on the wrist. More importantly, they shouldn't look up the penalty for what they've already done after the fact, find that their best course of action is to shut up and hope nobody noticed, and then not report the vulnerability.

The concern that we will have trouble distinguishing this person from a nefarious evildoer is kind of quaint. First, because this kind of poking around is not rare. As soon as you connect a server to the internet, there are immediately attempts to exploit it, continuously, forever.

But the malicious attacks are predominantly from outside of the United States. This is not a field where deterring the offenders through criminal penalties is an effective strategy. They're not in your jurisdiction. So we can safely err on the side of not punishing people who aren't committing some kind of overt independent crime, because we can't be relying on the penalty's deterrent regardless. We need the systems to be secure.

Conversely, if one of the baddies gets in and they are in your jurisdiction, you're not going to have trouble finding some other law to charge them with. Your server will be hosting somebody's dark web casino or fraudulent charges will show up on your customers' credit cards and the perpetrators can be charged with that even "unauthorized computer trespass" was a minor misdemeanor.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#733

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> the larger questions they raise about infrastructure security. Not your mission to fix a network design problem which should air gap all of those devices. USA taxpayers can't afford your agency scope creep.

I'll bite - so how do we get all those "air gapped"? It's a leading question of course.

The example was "energy infrastructure", so network group in those firms use their skills to set it up.

If any government group should be providing guidance and best practices on how to air gap devices, maybe NSA should write the standards. This FCC proposal looks like a ploy to spend the ever-growing pot (reportedly ten billion USD each year) from the regressive USF phone bill tax instead of reducing the USF tax.

As mentioned in another comment, a plug-and-play home device which provides network isolation and filtering for IoT devices may have a market. I would likely be a buyer at home.

"The bigger culprit is the FCC’s spending on USF, which is close to $10 billion per year, practically doubling in size since 2001."

https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2023/5/sen-cruz-it-s-past-du...

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#734
post #669

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How do you, as a user, determine whether your oven is in "safe mode" that the manufacturer has toggled, or in "safe mode" that makes the UI look the same as the real one, but is actually a malicious code that waits until 3AM to start the cleaning mode? I agree that these scenarios are (relatively) far fetched _now_; but if we expect the future to include connecting appliances like that to the internet, then solving p…

If the attacker has total control, then all bets are off no matter what mechanisms you put in first. Adding a safe mode would at least allow manufacturer to stop any non-total exploit without relying on the more complicated update mechanism. Also, the appliance would more likely work in a kinda normal way in the meantime.

> If the attacker has total control, then all bets are off no matter what mechanisms you put in first.

You could have a second SoC on the device running off ROM, whose only purpose is handling this safe mode and controlling internet access of the main device. Keep it simple and make it essentially just a fuse that can be blown (turning off internet access) by a signed message from the manufacturer. Keep the hardware capability of this SoC to just that, so even if you have a vulnerability on that thing itself, an attacker can't really do anything with it. Keep the code running on that SoC simple and preferably make it a FSM that is proven to be free of vulnerabilities. Also make sure the main device can't interfere with it in any way.

Once the fuse is blown, the user needs to press a physical button on the device to re-enable internet access. Preferably ship the devices with this internet access disabled by default.

Even better yet, don't build an internet connected oven... but that ship has sailed in many areas.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#735

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Remote update mechanisms can themselves present security problems in some domains. I've proposed many times that the device have a physical write-enable switch on it, not a software switch. That way, a malware infestation won't survive a reboot, and your backup hard drives won't get compromised. I'm amazed that nobody does this. (Hard drives used to have a write-enable switch on them.)

Why doesn't MS do similar on all of their OS code by placing it on a read-only filesystem? Only allow updates when reboot into an update mode.

Android does this. OS is read only. Updates happen on second partition and takes effect by swapping partition on reboot. Integrity is verified by secure boot.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#736
post #269

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I believe the regulation applies to such a device you make as well, not specifically consumer Wi-Fi products. I.e. if you make a transmitting SDR it's not supposed to allow certain things. The prevention all comes down to enforcement though, the law doesn't physically stop you from making a device it just means you could get in trouble for intentionally ignoring it and selling a lot of those devices.

You're totally right. I'm trying to make a moral argument, I think if it were unfeasible for an individual to make something (e.g. modern CPU) then you could make an argument for producers limiting them on the basis that it would effectively prevent anyone from doing the banned thing. The fact that it's roughly as easy to reflash an IoT device with custom firmware as it is to make an antenna that produces noise in a…

The (particular) law isn't actually aimed at stopping those who just want to go into their garage and produce illegal interference out of malice. E.g. people can create 200 Watt space heaters in their garage easily but it'd be odd to then conclude CPU regulations wouldn't stop people from doing bad things with CPUs.

That is to say, it's infeasible the average someone will make a working Wi-Fi radio which uses the Japanese channel 14 (involves changing what is sent by the radio, not just raising the frequency... unless you want to accurately re-adjust the frequency inside of your smartphone too) but it is reasonable to expect the average someone might just load some open firmware from the internet which allows them to set the channel to 14.

I will say I agree it's different than a lot of regulation. On the other thing I think that has more to do with radio space itself being very different than most things (i.e. a shared public resource) than inconsistency.

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#737
post #735

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why doesn't MS do similar on all of their OS code by placing it on a read-only filesystem? Only allow updates when reboot into an update mode.

Android does this. OS is read only. Updates happen on second partition and takes effect by swapping partition on reboot. Integrity is verified by secure boot.

Interesting. How is it verified? Maybe keep Merkle tree hash of eveything in TPM?

Re: Ask HN: I’m an FCC Commissioner proposing regulation of IoT security updates

#739
post #19

FWIW, seeing a security compliance label on an IoT product wouldn't mean anything to me as a consumer. There is no such thing as computer security in 2023, and there are no hints that security will exist at any point on the horizon. Even the biggest names in the field cannot put out secure products. Products from well-meaning manufacturers are going to be absolutely riddled with security problems, and putting a stick…

I understand your skepticism. That's why I want to see the label functioning as something like an enforceable representation to consumers. If someone wants to sell brick-proof glass, and get a sticker from the US Government saying so, it better be brick-proof.

> If someone wants to sell brick-proof glass, and get a sticker from the US Government

In a free society, why would we ask government (lowercase g) for a window certification sticker? Should government also provide condom anti-breakage stickers? If we want this, maybe UL can set the standard and ask for volunteer testers to affirm the condom or window anti-breakage quality.

Or maybe we can put the Bell System back together and let them regulate what devices may connect to the network. That led to expensive monthly handset charges.

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