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You should still protect against MITM attacks even with read-only websites - not all attacks are based on stealing user input.
What's the threat model here?
Like Airtel used to (still does?) in India.
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Earlier quoted context omitted.
You should still protect against MITM attacks even with read-only websites - not all attacks are based on stealing user input.
What's the threat model here?
Like Airtel used to (still does?) in India.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
From a site reliability perspective HTTPS is still broken. Some 15yo OS can't access any site because it doesn't have the certificates or cipher suites. And as you mentioned we need to update certs, webservers and DNS all the time to keep up to date. We only put up with it because it protects users from from snoopers. But that means we live in an inadequate equilibrium. If we abolished mass surveillance rather than i…
HTTPS is indeed broken when viewing it from a site reliability perspective. Anyone who has maintained more than a handful of domains simultaneously will agree (personally I’ve managed hundreds, each with their own certificate … it’s an awful experience).
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It like https. A lot of people in the past viewed HTTPS as a terrible idea that just broke things, and every example where someone had their website go down because of broken certificates or mixed content was proof that https as a concept was broken. Usually people brought up x.509 or revocation lists as the definitive proof that https would never be common.
Eh, except that HTTPS actually has tangible benefits, unlike DNSSEC.
We could return back to IPsec, or tunnel everything under https as a more modern version of IPsec, but those solutions are all disliked depending on who you ask.
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Thanks for the info, I'll keep it in mind for eventual future transfers. But shouldn't I be able to disable DNSSEC regardless, instead of the domain being stuck in limbo and hijacked by what appears to be a deadlock type of bug?
Disabling DNSSEC doesn't propagate instantly. Have you queried the CF nameservers for the domain directly? In my experience everything involving DNSSEC requires a 24h wait (unless the domain hasn't been queried from anywhere - but that's usually not the case, something might have triggered distributed DNS lookups e.g. LE doing DNS validation for cert issuance etc).
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Do you think criminals care about the law?
Criminals are much less likely to engage in MITM attacks, besides TLAs it's usually shady ISPs who want to inject some content (similar to surveillance that could be made illegal too, ISPs would in fact care). And criminals also have little incentive to attack read-only sites. Even if they did it might be more efficient to allocate resources to law enforcement rather than securing everything that could theoretically…
Can you provide a source, or even just reasoning, to why this would be true? In my experience, MiTM is a common enough attack vector used by criminals.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you think criminals care about the law?
Criminals are much less likely to engage in MITM attacks, besides TLAs it's usually shady ISPs who want to inject some content (similar to surveillance that could be made illegal too, ISPs would in fact care). And criminals also have little incentive to attack read-only sites. Even if they did it might be more efficient to allocate resources to law enforcement rather than securing everything that could theoretically…
DNSSEC is notorious for breaking things [1]. I use it on most of my domains, but I would not just 'enable' it on a domain that I cared about and that had real users without a lot of thought and planning. Nor should you. [1] - https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html
-- removed. My apologies. --