Live data from Hacker News

Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

news.ycombinator.com

31–40 of 133 posts

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#31

I don't think it is bugs which worries you, but rather the completely wrong concept of modern day car production. Almost all cars built in the past 20-years have 0 compliance with the laws of physics, being extremely front-heavy and with transversely-mounted engines - disbalanced even on the Y-axis. What keeps them from spinning is the so-called DSC/ESC/ESP which is basically a neural network. We all know how reliabl…

You're kidding if you think the premium brands you list don't have massive dependence on software systems. The basic physics is, as you say, better because they've kept mass distribution in line with how it was.

And how about the additional failure mode for say BMW. It's modern controllers have all the software for all the features in, just disabled unless you pay more. So a theoretic sophisticated attack could throw all sorts of crap into operation.

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#33

A long time ago I attended a DEFCON where this was discussed. Long before it became a big deal in the industry to have all this tech in cars. CANBUS was broken reliably, and if my memory serves me they even had a car you could take a shot at hacking yourself. After playing with it the entire conference I came to the conclusion I would never own a modern car if I can avoid it. Any car running CANBUS is vulnerable to a…

> CANBUS was broken reliably, and if my memory serves me they even had a car you could take a shot at hacking yourself.

This statement shows a fundamental lack of understanding of how automotive computer networks operate.

The CAN bus is just a network. It's an industrial control protocol that's been adopted by the automotive world. It doesn't offer security by design, it's intended for use in limited environments where all hardware on the network is known and trusted. CAN provides methods for prioritization of devices, that's it. Any security is left to higher layers of the stack.

There is no such thing as "breaking" CAN, you just physically connect to the network and you're able to talk to whatever controllers are on that network (most modern cars have multiple CAN buses connected to different subsets of the vehicle systems). At that point it's about the security features implemented by the devices on the network.

> Any car running CANBUS is vulnerable to a potentially fatal attack. They have not resolved this.

There is nothing to resolve at the network level. To put it another way, almost every computer that's ever been hacked over the internet was running Ethernet but that's just as irrelevant as CAN in cars.

If you are able to physically connect to the network, you can talk to and potentially spoof devices on the network.

> A car 25 years old has 99% of the safety features of a modern car and, in good working order, will protect you just the same.

You couldn't possibly be more wrong. Pick your favorite vehicle from 1997 and look up the crash test videos, then compare against a similar recent model.

Here's the most popular vehicle sold in the US, the Ford F-150, from 1997 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_i5EmJBaGeQ) versus one from 2016 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cou88zi4pMY). You tell me which one you'd rather be in.

You might say, correctly, that the 1997 F-150 is particularly bad, but here you can see a 1997 Volvo V70 versus a 2009 Volvo V70 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=msnJK0ce-VM). Volvo has a reputation for building some of the safest vehicles on the road, and even those twelve years show substantial gains in crash performance where the older car's passenger compartment is clearly compromised while the newer one's crumple zones work as intended.

> Or maybe I just don't worry about it because the probability of anything greater than a minor fender bender killing you is pretty high even with modern tech.

Again, absolutely wrong. I say this as someone who's flipped a truck off the road at highway speed and walked away with minor abrasions and bruising from the seatbelt and a few cuts from broken glass as the rest of the truck got ruined but the cab stayed intact. My anecdote is of course statistically meaningless, but the data agrees. Crash fatality rates have consistently trended downward from the '80s until 2020. The main reason modern vehicles have gained so much exterior size without gaining nearly as much interior size is all the space taken up by modern safety equipment, crumple zones, etc.

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#34
post #7

Your link of Sudden unintended acceleration contains a lot of entries related to this issue which don't involve computers at all. It lists pedal misapplication, entrapped pedals, stuck throttles, electrical shorts, and diesel engine runaway as other things which can cause such an issue. A lot of the reported incidents had nothing to do with software. Either way, if you've had a fuel injected car you were still expose…

>There's a ton of things that can go wrong in a car which can cause an accident.

And pretty much none of them ever do if the driver doesn't react exceptionally poorly. Even the spectacular stuff that the internet absolutely loves to hand wring about, like a wheel falling off for whatever reason, almost always results in the car coming to a controlled stop on the side of the road. The conversion rate between "failures" and "meaningful harm to anyone or anything is abysmal."

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#37
post #7

Your link of Sudden unintended acceleration contains a lot of entries related to this issue which don't involve computers at all. It lists pedal misapplication, entrapped pedals, stuck throttles, electrical shorts, and diesel engine runaway as other things which can cause such an issue. A lot of the reported incidents had nothing to do with software. Either way, if you've had a fuel injected car you were still expose…

> It lists pedal misapplication, entrapped pedals, stuck throttles, electrical shorts, and diesel engine runaway as other things which can cause such an issue.

And modern cars are much better at handling these types of scenarios. For example, in my late model car, if you apply the accelerator and brake at the same time, the vehicle will ignore the accelerator input. This solves two potential problems from the past: someone accidentally stomping on both pedals when they meant to hit the brake, and a foreign object wedging the accelerator pedal down.

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#38

ISO 26262 is the functional safety standard that automobile manufacturers adhere to. Furthermore, companies with a strong safety culture may also have other safety controls, including MISRA, AUTOSAR, and others. I think reputable car companies take this stuff very seriously, but your concern is also well placed.

It's worth noting that ISO 26262 is mostly concerned with preventing faults due to system failure, e.g. spurious hardware faults, hardware degradation over time, etc. As an example, it doesn't have much to say about preventing a child from being misclassified as a bollard. It's a quite robust standard, and one most auto makers (certainly the European ones) have spent a lot of effort processing and following for quite some time now (in my limited experience).

There's a separate standard (ISO 21448) trying to address issues with safety of intent, i.e. maintaining safety when there's no actual fault in the system. (Like the misclassification example.) This one's newer, much less effort has been spent developing it, and even less has been spent trying to follow it. Frankly it doesn't have as much to say. (And how could it? Nobody knows how to solve general classification problems, and especially not with something running on some 20 W max control unit.) This part of the problem space is basically the wild west. Some auto makers do a good effort trying to create safe solutions. Others not so much.

In summary, some of the electronics solutions in the car can probably be trusted to do what they're meant to (e.g. airbags). Others (e.g. lane keeping assist, emergency braking) are still still mostly be safe but certainly warrant keeping your hands on the wheel. Anything approaching fully self driving is at best quite dubious at this point though.

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#39
post #7

Your link of Sudden unintended acceleration contains a lot of entries related to this issue which don't involve computers at all. It lists pedal misapplication, entrapped pedals, stuck throttles, electrical shorts, and diesel engine runaway as other things which can cause such an issue. A lot of the reported incidents had nothing to do with software. Either way, if you've had a fuel injected car you were still expose…

>There's a ton of things that can go wrong in a car which can cause an accident. And pretty much none of them ever do if the driver doesn't react exceptionally poorly. Even the spectacular stuff that the internet absolutely loves to hand wring about, like a wheel falling off for whatever reason, almost always results in the car coming to a controlled stop on the side of the road. The conversion rate between "failures…

Agreed. The biggest component failure leading to injuries is by far the one in the driver's seat.

Re: Ask HN: Risk of unsafe software in automobiles?

#40
post #7

Your link of Sudden unintended acceleration contains a lot of entries related to this issue which don't involve computers at all. It lists pedal misapplication, entrapped pedals, stuck throttles, electrical shorts, and diesel engine runaway as other things which can cause such an issue. A lot of the reported incidents had nothing to do with software. Either way, if you've had a fuel injected car you were still expose…

>There's a ton of things that can go wrong in a car which can cause an accident. And pretty much none of them ever do if the driver doesn't react exceptionally poorly. Even the spectacular stuff that the internet absolutely loves to hand wring about, like a wheel falling off for whatever reason, almost always results in the car coming to a controlled stop on the side of the road. The conversion rate between "failures…

That’s true now, because most of the critical systems have redundancy. I wouldn’t want to drive a vehicle with one brake circuit and no throttle return spring, though. It has been a very long time since that was the case, but those days are probably where the mechanical failure horror stories come from.
Post reply on HN