Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This is an unhelpful nebulous statement, at its worst a circular definition and victim to the Münchhausen trilemma. It is most certainly not circular. We are knowing agents first and know things spontaneously. Only on reflection do we begin to ask what knowledge is, what the limits of rational inquiry are, etc. But to be able to reflect on something, there must first be something to reflect on. Thus, we must know s…
> This was never my claim. I only claimed that epistemology is not an ideal starting point. Obviously, epistemology predates Descartes. Modern philosophy onward (that is to say, beginning with Descartes, traditionally, anyway) shifts its concerns away from metaphysics to epistemology. Thus, epistemology supplants metaphysics as what one might call the primary concern of philosophical inquiry. Critique of Pure Reason…
So your plan is to rely on some extra-rational means of developing this epistemology? That's quite a feat. Though I shudder to ask: how would you know your method leads to the truth?
> Thirdly, these knowing agents are often victims to fallacies, delusions, and severe hallucinations
How would you know? Wouldn't you need to have apprehended a truth by which you could judge something to be a hallucination?