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Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

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Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#21
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If that were true, would that then mean that age would be malleable by flipping around and deleting and duplicating blocks? How does it ensure continuity without preventing recovery of blocks subsequent to the bad one? I have not dug into the age code to figure out how the encryption works so I am guessing here.

I'm not sure you understand what the previous commenter was suggesting. They're saying the receiver of an `age` message could, in theory, skip authenticating the ciphertext. They would have to do so deliberately (so deliberately that the code to do it doesn't exist), and the entire point of doing so would be to defeat message security in an attempt to do data recovery. I think you should probably dig into the age cod…

The actual damaged 64K age blocks would likely be unrecoverable after the start of the damage unless the chacha20-poly1305 ended being self synchronizing as it was used (as opposed to the CFB that OpenPGP specifies). The question I can't answer is if the undamaged 64K age blocks would then be recoverable. There might be just a counter, but you could instead (also) make a particular block dependent on the previous one(s).

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#22

If you have gnupg installed, emacs can just open foo.org.gpg files directly. It decrypts on load and re-encrypts on save. Probably you would get better answers about Emacs on https://emacs.stackexchange.com/ or https://www.reddit.com/r/emacs/ .

I am just considering the fact after 10-15 yrs would it be possible to still read those files? I use it (gnupg) for some of the data in my org files. It's just long term use, I'm concerned about.

If your concern is in the long term, wouldn't you want to put your trust in the most mature and long lasting project today (i.e. gpg)? Nobody can see the future, but given that gpg is open source and has been actively developed for over 20 years I feel comfortable trusting it to continue to exist.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#23
Why not keep the notes in a VeraCrypt/TrueCrypt drive/partition? You can sidestep all the gpg complexity, and you get a little better protection since note filenames won't even be visible (and if you're really paranoid you can entirely obfuscate and hide the encrypted drive in unused partition space).

Or just tick on the full disk encryption option in your OS (assuming it's a modern one like Win 10, recent Ubuntu, etc.). It's just as good at keeping your data protected at rest as any other encryption option you can run in userspace, and there's less chance of some file operation snafu accidentally unencrypting or leaking your data.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#24
post #13
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The #emacs channel on Libera Chat (irc.libera.chat:6697) is indeed a very friendly and fun channel. For those you are new to IRC and want to take a quick glance at the channel without choosing clients and configuring them, here is a web-based interface to connect to the #emacs channel: https://web.libera.chat/#emacs Here is the Matrix bridge for it accessible via Element's web interface: https://app.element.io/#/room…

Also, for emacs users, you want to point ERC to irc.libera.chat as per: https://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/EmacsChannel

I haven't really followed the freenode implosion. Is libera the canonical replacement server, in some sense?

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#25
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure you understand what the previous commenter was suggesting. They're saying the receiver of an `age` message could, in theory, skip authenticating the ciphertext. They would have to do so deliberately (so deliberately that the code to do it doesn't exist), and the entire point of doing so would be to defeat message security in an attempt to do data recovery. I think you should probably dig into the age cod…

The actual damaged 64K age blocks would likely be unrecoverable after the start of the damage unless the chacha20-poly1305 ended being self synchronizing as it was used (as opposed to the CFB that OpenPGP specifies). The question I can't answer is if the undamaged 64K age blocks would then be recoverable. There might be just a counter, but you could instead (also) make a particular block dependent on the previous one…

Do you understand that chacha20 is CTR? A bit flip only affects that single bit, does not propagate to any other bits?

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#26
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Also, for emacs users, you want to point ERC to irc.libera.chat as per: https://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/EmacsChannel

I haven't really followed the freenode implosion. Is libera the canonical replacement server, in some sense?

Yes. It's run by the original (pre-takeover) Freenode staff.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The actual damaged 64K age blocks would likely be unrecoverable after the start of the damage unless the chacha20-poly1305 ended being self synchronizing as it was used (as opposed to the CFB that OpenPGP specifies). The question I can't answer is if the undamaged 64K age blocks would then be recoverable. There might be just a counter, but you could instead (also) make a particular block dependent on the previous one…

Do you understand that chacha20 is CTR? A bit flip only affects that single bit, does not propagate to any other bits?

From that can I get that an age recovery utility would need to detect missing data and would then need to insert dummy blocks (or the equivalent)? I guess there would have to be an minor element of brute force involved as there would be no easy way to distinguish bad blocks from the blocks after the missing chunk.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#28
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I haven't really followed the freenode implosion. Is libera the canonical replacement server, in some sense?

Yes. It's run by the original (pre-takeover) Freenode staff.

Thanks.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#29

Why not keep the notes in a VeraCrypt/TrueCrypt drive/partition? You can sidestep all the gpg complexity, and you get a little better protection since note filenames won't even be visible (and if you're really paranoid you can entirely obfuscate and hide the encrypted drive in unused partition space). Or just tick on the full disk encryption option in your OS (assuming it's a modern one like Win 10, recent Ubuntu, et…

That is often good, but it does leave mounted volumes accessible to other programs, where GPG files can be decrypted only inside EMACS. Whether this matters depends on your threat model.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#30

A good place to ask questions like this is the (very friendly) Emacs subreddit.[1] [1] https://reddit.com/r/emacs

The problem with everyone having moved from forums over to subreddits is that in order to interact with the community/ask qiuestions/whatever, you need to have a Reddit account and deal with Reddit's dark patterns, data collection and general disrespect for their users.
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