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@matthew_d_green twitter feed has a regular stream of high-quality Signal commentary.
[1] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/06/new-e...
[2] https://twitter.com/signalapp/status/1262844332278603777
Best way to avoid interference or maintain security is to adopt old school tactics. Look at the war games the military played to prepare for Iraq and how the low tech red team comms worked.
Best way to avoid interference or maintain security is to adopt old school tactics. Look at the war games the military played to prepare for Iraq and how the low tech red team comms worked.
Exactly. If you think you need Signal, you probably really need to STFU.
My point is if you are concerned that the government is monitoring your communications (presumably related to the protests), then electronic methods are not reliable. Even if the encryption is solid, they could start jamming the frequencies used.
Best way to avoid interference or maintain security is to adopt old school tactics. Look at the war games the military played to prepare for Iraq and how the low tech red team comms worked.
Exactly. If you think you need Signal, you probably really need to STFU.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Exactly. If you think you need Signal, you probably really need to STFU.
Do you work for Chinese government?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Exactly. If you think you need Signal, you probably really need to STFU.
Or you can communicate outside of electronic channels. My point is if you are concerned that the government is monitoring your communications (presumably related to the protests), then electronic methods are not reliable. Even if the encryption is solid, they could start jamming the frequencies used.
In the 2000s, drug dealers figured out that Nextel direct connect weren't tracable... so Nextel kiosks sprung up in the hood and you'd see them all over. After that, prepaid burners were the next thing, followed by BlackBerry, etc.
If your organizing protests in such a way that are going to attract surveillance, "Use X" is dumb advice. It depends on the situation and what consequences you can sustain. An activist may want to be arrested. A Federal employee may sacrifice their career just for being present. Context matters, but the smart path is to leave your phone at home.
Rather than conspiracies theories of, depends if you are a spy or not. Anyone want to explain where Signal fails for top level spying and Nation States are coming after you? And what the safer alternative is?
The biggest issue with signal is the forced reveal of your phone number. There are several good alternatives. Wickr and session come to mind.
It all depends on the context / your threat model. Do you want to prevent a service provider from reading your messages? It's good. Do you want to be the next Snowden? Probably not. Do you trust people you talk to? Etc.
[1]:https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/986277159252750336?s=20
[2]:https://signal.org