Earlier quoted context omitted.
I understand that Europe is more secure with chip+pin, but in the US, debit cards do exactly what you describe. If fraud happens, you are out money until it is resolved. The key difference from cash, in the US, is the ability to abuse cards at a later date without the physical card. For someone to steal your wallet, they have to be colocated with you and can only steal as much as you're walking around with. As long a…
> As long as debit cards have a magnetic stripe and have their full number printed on them, and that information is useful, this problem remains. Which the EEA/UK has also (partially) solved by enforcing Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) that mandates that (most) transactions require MFA.
When adding a card to a taxi app for example I get SCA prompt for a zero amount, but then they can charge me for any amount without subsequent SCA flows.
Presumably those subsequent transactions wouldn’t have a liability shift to the issuer but it still means that they can at least temporarily steal all your money until your chargeback claim goes through.
The whole concept of “card number” is rotten. What’s needed is an oAuth2-type system where every payment needs to redirect to the bank (actual redirect, no stupid hacky iframe like SCA/3DSecure is) and where you can see the merchant and set the max amount (and whether one-off or recurring) and the bank records that and keeps a list of authorized merchants so you can revoke them at any time. The merchant then must use this token to pull money, and can't pull more than what the token allows - just like your usual oAuth2 scopes.