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As long as the encryption methods used produce data which cannot be differentiated from pseudo-random data, then it's impossible to tell whether there's any video on there at all.
Pretty neat. :-)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Presumably, you lose access to it, but nobody else is able to access your video either.
Yeah I read a little more and realized that the video is actually stored on the device. For some reason I didn't get that immediately. I would have concerns using something like this, if someone ransacked my place of business or whatever (and it looks like this is targeted towards people who might have that sort of problem), it would be problematic if I couldn't view the video it recorded just because I didn't have t…
It looks like there's no reason why the camera and the device have to be within a certain number of feet of each-other, other than limitations in cable and such. So, you could lock the device inside of a safe constructed specifically for it, or inside a wall, or something. (I actually have a client with a real "false bookcase", and that would be an idea storage area.)
I bet they could upgrade their software to allow you to download a copy of your encrypted video. They've yet to release their specific algorithms used, but I don't see anything that would prevent that based on their diagrams and text.
Not sure what the software updates include but for the hardware I would expect live-time warranty or at least something reasonable, like 5 to 10 years.
Other than that. Nice product.
Sounds like it solves the "Oh noes they stole our sex tape" concern most celebrities seem to have these days...
Generally when I hear the term "deniable" used with something security related, I think of something like the hidden volumes in True Crypt: something that I can't be proved to have. Does your product provide this level of deniability? I would venture a guess that the answer is no (after all, there is a box with a big "DV" on it). If not, what do you mean by the word deniable?
1. If the hard drive is making a lot of noise it is probably recording video.
2. This is security through obscurity. The data is not being encrypted in a standard way. But the binaries on the computer that are used to decrypt the data can be decompiled to discover this obscure method. At that point you have no advantage over other encryption programs.
If you want to be deniable get rid of the hard drive and require an internet connection. Then when someone gets your "DV" unit and asks where the video is you can say it was set to live streaming mode and is never recorded.Generally when I hear the term "deniable" used with something security related, I think of something like the hidden volumes in True Crypt: something that I can't be proved to have. Does your product provide this level of deniability? I would venture a guess that the answer is no (after all, there is a box with a big "DV" on it). If not, what do you mean by the word deniable?
This is answered directly on their website. They record the video in a way that supposedly makes it impossible to determine if video has actually been recorded at all. Thus, you can simply say, "Well, sure, I've got the box, but it hasn't been recording anything", and nobody can prove otherwise. I'm still reading the site to see if I can understand the technical basis for their claims.
They address the coercion (either by law enforcement or guy with a gun), by allowing you to make hidden volumes inside the main volume. You open the main volume, filled with data you don't care about, and they never know that a hidden volume resides deeper.
I see no reason that this same technique wouldn't work here. You record some boring video on the main volume, and record your main video on a hidden volume.