11–16 of 16 posts
There is a free will that is easily proven.
I could give elaborate answer to your question, but I chose to give a short and primitive one.
You’ve made in the image of god and got a gift of free will. Live with it :)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The problem starts in assuming “the portion humans operate in” is relevant or reasonable the question is whether humans have control over their actions. human operations are definitionally relevant. you seem to suggest throwing away determinism because there are open questions at extreme scales. but determinism does explain reality at the scale we're interested in, and you haven't offered a comparable explanation.…
Most people taking determinism seriously is exactly the same as most people taking God seriously, when neither determinism or God is provably known to be present or absent from the situation. Any attempt to decide the question of free will on either flimsy foundation is, really, just navel-gazing seriously. Occam’s Razor, used properly, looks for the explanation with the least number of constituent assumptions; if th…
Many believe in determinism, or at least the functional equivalent, and it poses a challenge to the popular belief that we can choose what we do. That’s the problem I’m interested in understanding.
Indeterminism, which includes that base layer of randomness, still presents a dilemma with regards to free will, doesn’t it? From the perspective of free will, and absent a more explanatory theory, they are functionally equivalent theories. Whether my brain is randomly producing actions or from an infinite chain of determined causes or a mix, free will is nowhere to be found without a more precise explanation.
The question is about free will given different assumptions of reality. My main challenge with your angle is that it’s firmly missing the point.
I am not arguing for determinism, nor the existence of God, but since I’m asking what people believe, I’m including both answers as options.
I would like to drive a nail in the coffin of “deterministic causality” by at least two mechanisms. - In every scope there is a super scope which may influence in incalculable ways (however well their rules maybe understood.) Even in a model of the whole Universe, the base potential of cosmic background radiation (non-zero vacuum of void) is a non deterministic influence. - ultimately radiological decay may not be pr…
Thanks for this! I suppose for our purposes, both determinism and indeterminism create the same paradox of free will. Determinism gives every event a determined prior cause, and indeterminism opens the door for random or otherwise undetermined prior causes, but both are incompatible with the notion of free will. Would you agree with that reframing, or am I missing something?
I am a proponent that consciousness allows a singular resolve from constructive and destructive interference. This may not sound like much, though it is better than “swerving atoms.” My constructive and destructive interference has been shaped by a life of tenacious willfulness and expansive trial and error.
I suppose I would claim preemptive error correction makes my will more free than that of my muddle minded reactionary peers.
Determination of resolve and determinism are two separate uses of the same word, confusing their interdependency.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most people taking determinism seriously is exactly the same as most people taking God seriously, when neither determinism or God is provably known to be present or absent from the situation. Any attempt to decide the question of free will on either flimsy foundation is, really, just navel-gazing seriously. Occam’s Razor, used properly, looks for the explanation with the least number of constituent assumptions; if th…
The original post is a question about people’s beliefs, not a proof or a case for any one belief. Many believe in determinism, or at least the functional equivalent, and it poses a challenge to the popular belief that we can choose what we do. That’s the problem I’m interested in understanding. Indeterminism, which includes that base layer of randomness, still presents a dilemma with regards to free will, doesn’t it?…
The effect of a deterministic universe on the question of free will is only of interest once we determine we’re in such a universe. We have not done so. At this stage asking that question is no more or less meaningful than asking how everyone feels about living in a universe in which the answer is 43 or where we know the circle can be squared.
Now, yes, the question of how fundamental indeterminacy would effect free will is also premature, though arguably more interesting if only because it hasn’t been churned over by pedants for millennia.