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Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

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Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#11

If you have gnupg installed, emacs can just open foo.org.gpg files directly. It decrypts on load and re-encrypts on save. Probably you would get better answers about Emacs on https://emacs.stackexchange.com/ or https://www.reddit.com/r/emacs/ .

I've always had trouble getting it to cache the password between opening and closing (with symmetric encryption).

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#13
post #9

come ask on libera in #emacs

The #emacs channel on Libera Chat (irc.libera.chat:6697) is indeed a very friendly and fun channel. For those you are new to IRC and want to take a quick glance at the channel without choosing clients and configuring them, here is a web-based interface to connect to the #emacs channel: https://web.libera.chat/#emacs Here is the Matrix bridge for it accessible via Element's web interface: https://app.element.io/#/room…

Also, for emacs users, you want to point ERC to irc.libera.chat as per: https://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/EmacsChannel

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#15
post #10

>Debian abandoning it for signing packages and it's general lack of usage. This is not true. There was a proposal near the start of the year. That proposal has been almost entirely ignored. Would age provide any advantage over GnuPG to make it worth the bother to switch to a new message format? * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:agevspgp

There is a live proposal right now, by one of the Debian apt developers, who was just here a couple days ago talking about it. I agree, it's not clear what's happening yet, but signify-style apt signatures are not a past-tense thing right now. I don't want to reopen a can of worms on that very weird age vs. PGP thing you wrote (Debian isn't going to use age) but again, I think you should correct it, because it openly…

The proposal has no place to go at this point. It may come back in the future, but right at the moment it is effectively dead.

If you are doing FEC then you need to decide how many bits you are going to be able to correct. That determines the amount of redundancy you need. Media problems generally come in physical media sized chunks, often adjacent. Hundreds, thousands or millions of bits might be involved. FEC is not a magic bullet for data loss, particularly in this case. Usually the best you can do is to recover the good parts and age deliberately prevents you from doing that.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#16
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a live proposal right now, by one of the Debian apt developers, who was just here a couple days ago talking about it. I agree, it's not clear what's happening yet, but signify-style apt signatures are not a past-tense thing right now. I don't want to reopen a can of worms on that very weird age vs. PGP thing you wrote (Debian isn't going to use age) but again, I think you should correct it, because it openly…

The proposal has no place to go at this point. It may come back in the future, but right at the moment it is effectively dead. If you are doing FEC then you need to decide how many bits you are going to be able to correct. That determines the amount of redundancy you need. Media problems generally come in physical media sized chunks, often adjacent. Hundreds, thousands or millions of bits might be involved. FEC is no…

You can run chacha20-poly1305 decryption without verifying the MAC, and accept that an adversary can accurately bitflip any and all bits they want. Normal tools don't have command line flags for that, but a recovery tool can do that no problem using the same exact code as age.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The proposal has no place to go at this point. It may come back in the future, but right at the moment it is effectively dead. If you are doing FEC then you need to decide how many bits you are going to be able to correct. That determines the amount of redundancy you need. Media problems generally come in physical media sized chunks, often adjacent. Hundreds, thousands or millions of bits might be involved. FEC is no…

You can run chacha20-poly1305 decryption without verifying the MAC, and accept that an adversary can accurately bitflip any and all bits they want. Normal tools don't have command line flags for that, but a recovery tool can do that no problem using the same exact code as age.

If that were true, would that then mean that age would be malleable by flipping around and deleting and duplicating blocks? How does it ensure continuity without preventing recovery of blocks subsequent to the bad one? I have not dug into the age code to figure out how the encryption works so I am guessing here.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can run chacha20-poly1305 decryption without verifying the MAC, and accept that an adversary can accurately bitflip any and all bits they want. Normal tools don't have command line flags for that, but a recovery tool can do that no problem using the same exact code as age.

If that were true, would that then mean that age would be malleable by flipping around and deleting and duplicating blocks? How does it ensure continuity without preventing recovery of blocks subsequent to the bad one? I have not dug into the age code to figure out how the encryption works so I am guessing here.

I'm not sure you understand what the previous commenter was suggesting. They're saying the receiver of an `age` message could, in theory, skip authenticating the ciphertext. They would have to do so deliberately (so deliberately that the code to do it doesn't exist), and the entire point of doing so would be to defeat message security in an attempt to do data recovery.

I think you should probably dig into the age code before writing posts about why PGP is better than age. The question of whether adversaries can modify age messages in transit is a pretty basic one.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#19

If you have gnupg installed, emacs can just open foo.org.gpg files directly. It decrypts on load and re-encrypts on save. Probably you would get better answers about Emacs on https://emacs.stackexchange.com/ or https://www.reddit.com/r/emacs/ .

I am just considering the fact after 10-15 yrs would it be possible to still read those files? I use it (gnupg) for some of the data in my org files. It's just long term use, I'm concerned about.

Re: Ask HN: In Emacs, is there an alternative to GPG encryption in Org Mode?

#20

>Debian abandoning it for signing packages and it's general lack of usage. This is not true. There was a proposal near the start of the year. That proposal has been almost entirely ignored. Would age provide any advantage over GnuPG to make it worth the bother to switch to a new message format? * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:agevspgp

The major concern is only about long term stability, with people starting to talk about stopping things, some paranoia kicked in.

'age' is still quite beta, so not sure if it's entirely worth the switch. But yeah I guess the long-term archival is something that I hope to have.

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