11–20 of 47 posts
Multiple engineers have testified before congress that they were ordered to make systems easy to hack. This has been going on for decades and nothing has changed AFAIK. I suspect everything will go fully electronic with no paper-trail, despite my having a paper trail every time I fuel up my vehicle.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The most important feature of a paper ballot is that the general populace can read them, and understand how they work. The worst feature of any electronic-only voting system is that the general populace cannot verify that they work. This is a bad thing even in the case where no hacking occurred, since it reduces trust in the validity of the outcome by anyone who dislikes the result.
The general populace can't really verify the results of paper ballots either, that would mean letting anyone who wanted to do their own manual counts of all ballots.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The general populace can't really verify the results of paper ballots either, that would mean letting anyone who wanted to do their own manual counts of all ballots.
https://www.eac.gov/voters/become-a-poll-worker/
And a single poll worker still wouldn't be able to verify all of the votes in an election. There's still an insurmountable trust issue where most of the public has to accept the results from what amounts to a black box, which paper ballots don't entirely solve.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The most important feature of a paper ballot is that the general populace can read them, and understand how they work. The worst feature of any electronic-only voting system is that the general populace cannot verify that they work. This is a bad thing even in the case where no hacking occurred, since it reduces trust in the validity of the outcome by anyone who dislikes the result.
The general populace can't really verify the results of paper ballots either, that would mean letting anyone who wanted to do their own manual counts of all ballots.
It is done onsite so there is no risk of tempering.
If you wanted, you could stand next to the transparent ballot box the entire day and then count yourself.
The results are available a couple hours later. I can't think of any downside.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
https://www.eac.gov/voters/become-a-poll-worker/
A poll worker isn't the general public, though, that's still a limited number of privileged individuals. The general public would be literally anyone off the street. And a single poll worker still wouldn't be able to verify all of the votes in an election. There's still an insurmountable trust issue where most of the public has to accept the results from what amounts to a black box, which paper ballots don't entirely…
In Australia we have observers for the counting process and every party or candidate can send representatives. Political parties are practically begging for volunteers in this role. We also have a much more complex preferential voting system but the manual counting process still shows results 30-60 minutes after polls close in all but the tightest races.
> And a single poll worker still wouldn't be able to verify all of the votes in an election.
Anyone cheating would have to involve a huge number of people around the country and the people watching those people. Getting elected legitimately would be far easier.
Why would you convince them to discard something that is at least better than the alternative? Manual voting systems are easily to hack and more difficult to find who/when or even if it was hacked.
How would you hack a paper ballot? You see your choices in paper. You place the paper in a ballot box. The ballot box is watched by people on both sides. The ballot box is sealed and transparently transported to a counting facility. The ballot counting is observed by people on both sides. The counting facility counts the ballots twice, with both counts having to agree. The counts are communicated to a central tallyin…
You vote electronically on a machine and it prints a paper vote.
You verify the paper vote is what you entered and then place it in the ballot box.
The machine can give an "unverified" counts in real-time to tally up results.
The votes can be verified later on using the manual method of counting paper votes. These can be cross-checked with what the machine has said.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
How would you hack a paper ballot? You see your choices in paper. You place the paper in a ballot box. The ballot box is watched by people on both sides. The ballot box is sealed and transparently transported to a counting facility. The ballot counting is observed by people on both sides. The counting facility counts the ballots twice, with both counts having to agree. The counts are communicated to a central tallyin…
I really think a hybrid solution is the best option. You vote electronically on a machine and it prints a paper vote. You verify the paper vote is what you entered and then place it in the ballot box. The machine can give an "unverified" counts in real-time to tally up results. The votes can be verified later on using the manual method of counting paper votes. These can be cross-checked with what the machine has said…
Makes it fairly easy to identify a box and verify if needed and identity a possible suspect machine and etc.
I does the best job of preserving the voter's clear choices made by them, filtered by nobody.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The most important feature of a paper ballot is that the general populace can read them, and understand how they work. The worst feature of any electronic-only voting system is that the general populace cannot verify that they work. This is a bad thing even in the case where no hacking occurred, since it reduces trust in the validity of the outcome by anyone who dislikes the result.
The general populace can't really verify the results of paper ballots either, that would mean letting anyone who wanted to do their own manual counts of all ballots.
At this point, voting by mail seems to be the way to go in places that are going all in with software systems.