Viewing profile — zimmerfrei

> AMD ROCm is only supported in the rocm branch. Has anybody tried it? There is a lot of emphasis on MacBook Pro in this thread, but I would like to use it with an AMD Halo Strix w…

> Nvidia released the first Shield Android TV in 2015 > it took about 18 months to [create] an entirely new security stack [...] Android updates aren’t actually that much work comp…

I don't think that a 100% anonymous attestation protocol is what most people need and want. It would be sufficient to be able to freely choose who you trust as proxy for your attes…

If you use AEAD, you clearly expect your recipients to use a recent client. Same as if you want to use PQC or any other recent feature. If your audience is wider, dont use AEAD but…

It is not a coincidence that most of the various proposed alternatives to PGP (signal, wormhole, age, minisign, etc) are led by a single golden implementation and neither support n…

When you encrypt something, you are the one deciding which level of interoperability you want and you can select the crypto primitives matching capabilities you know you recipient …

As mentioned a few days ago, this post mainly covers a gpg problem not a PGP problem. I recommend people to spend some time and try out sequoia (sq) [0][1], which is a sane, clean …

This is the right answer. The problem mostly concerns the oldest parts of PGP (the protocol), which gpg (the implementation) doesn't want or cannot get rid of.

Yes, there are methods to combine multiple, different key exchange algorithms so that you need to break all, like in: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9370/ https://datatracker.…

I like it, because it is indeed nice to have a NIST-backed construction. But at the same time, it is disappointing that you get locked out of several niceties of NIST KDFs, such as…

Let's assume that you have a simple XOR between two registers. If the CPU can pre-label a register as having no bits set (and they can or speculate on it), during scheduling, it co…

Your argument boils down to "all hardware implementations so far in history never optimized word boolean operations so future implementations will keep doing so". I think that is j…

You assume that boolean operations are constant time, and whether that holds depends on the uarchitecture and how sophisticated the optimization layers are (e.g. nothing prevents t…

That's still described as a kernel for the TEE (like OPTEE is), it doesn't look like a replacement for Linux, which runs in the REE.

But then, the vast majority of the affected libraries in that page don't use GMP at all, but their own custom implementation (including openssl). In reality, RSA signing with blind…

Certainly Google (and Oracle and AWS): https://www.marvell.com/company/newsroom/marvell-enables-ent...

More interestingly, Cavium (now Marvell) also designed and manufactured the HSMs which are used by the top cloud providers (such as AWS, GCP, possibly Azure too), to hold the most …

>> The discrete TPM's threat model was never designed to cover you from attackers using oscilloscope to probe your laptop's SPI bus during the boot process for unencrypted data. Th…

>> Pixel phones (and all other phones running Tiramisu+) can attest to the full DICE chain's integrity to any app that requests it. This can be done through the KeyStore API. I do …

> I also noticed how the TCG manages to promote DICE without noticing it makes their baby TPM 2.0 obsolete. Alas, TCG seems to have recognized the mistake, so they have recently pr…