Live data from Hacker News

Viewing profile — twr

twr

HN member
Joined
Thu, Apr 14, 2016, 10:01 PM UTC
HN karma
172
Public activity
89 items

About twr

No profile information was provided.

Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #19050158

    Apple also weirdly limits the capabilities available to free developer accounts, like AutoFill and built-in IPSec/IKEv2 VPN support. https://help.apple.com/developer-account/#/dev2…

  2. comment
    Comment #17915132

    If you didn't trust the closed source disassembler you use, for whatever reason, you would verify the assembly output, not the actual software. In practice this is often done unint…

  3. comment
    Comment #17637670

    This is a good point, which should be brought up more. Although you probably meant key id or key fingerprint, not keyserver ID, which would imply something else. You're supposed to…

  4. comment
    Comment #17636810

    Linux/BSD distribution mirrors don't control the package signing keys, maintainers do. Similarly, Google doesn't possess the ability to push out updates for third-party apps, witho…

  5. comment
    Comment #17636745

    No, there's no effective difference between those examples, apart from maybe post mortem analysis. It's also a poor method of key discovery, as hueving said.

  6. comment
    Comment #17636705

    It doesn't take ridiculous confidence to analyze shell scripts. In the hundreds of scripts I have read, few were more than 100 lines long. It shouldn't take more than 60 seconds (p…

  7. comment
    Comment #17624291

    I agree with you that Keybase should release their backend code. My comment about (server source code- derived) trust was made in the context of users who would remain using the of…

  8. comment
    Comment #17623862

    I didn’t dispute the description of Keybase being labeled a walled garden. I opposed it being too-broadly called proprietary, when it’s not — only the backend is. And for anyone on…

  9. comment
    Comment #17623276

    I'm glad the mobile apps don't download code, and I really appreciate the correction on Lavabit; ugh, that project was embarrassing. I'm personally not happy with auditing local cl…

  10. comment
    Comment #17623255

    Considering the whole point of end-to-end encryption is to reduce or eliminate necessary trust in the middleman, this seems like a minor, but still valid concern. Open sourcing the…

  11. comment
    Comment #17622873

    Proprietary? The backend maybe, but the keybase clients are open source. Some of the code is a little rough, and completed API docs would be nice, especially concerning KBFS, which…

  12. comment
    Comment #17613986

    The quote is from the front page of protonmail.com, and it's been there since 2015. As the only description of encryption on the front page, it gives the unequivocal impression tha…

  13. comment
    Comment #17612459

    secured automatically with end-to-end encryption is a funny way of saying secured automatically with TLS. If some messages are being encrypted on the server, then it's not end-to-e…

  14. comment
    Comment #17405510

    I mean, if you want visceral, there is this shameful email from Dan Harkins: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10971.h...

  15. comment
    Comment #17098288

    I think this sentiment explains half of the negative reactions I’ve seen towards Moxie over the years. I guess it pays to be likeable.

  16. comment
    Comment #17097956

    I don't know if this is correct, but, I once got the impression that Signal Desktop was under the sole purview of a new hire at OWS. In other words, Moxie doesn't review the commit…

  17. comment
    Comment #17097849

    Given the absent security of desktop Linux, and the dreadful opsec of its users, as revealed by many cryptocurrency wallet thefts, I wouldn't place much trust in persistent PGP sec…

  18. comment
    Comment #17086294

    Signal, WhatsApp, Matrix et al. show notifications when the participant’s device keys change. You’re right that most users don’t verify. The opportunity for detection or prevention…

  19. comment
    Comment #17078605

    Again, you can be sure, by comparing the safety numbers. It's the same as comparing SSH or GPG key fingerprints. If someone else masquerades as Bob, the numbers won't match. See se…

  20. comment
    Comment #17078575

    It isn't. I rarely send sensitive messages, however, so I feel that some surveillance potential is acceptable, to save time and effort. The few times where I did, I first verified …

  21. comment
    Comment #17073173

    Signal doesn't entrust security to carriers. Messages are sent E2E encrypted to the registered device over the internet. If someone MitMs a device, the safety numbers would not mat…

  22. comment
    Comment #16731793

    Unbound lets you forward queries to nameservers matched by the query (sub-)domain. *.internal queries can be sent to the local nameserver, for example, while others can be forwarde…

  23. comment
  24. comment
    Comment #13487625

    https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/26589529219124838... Edit: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/40897761692683059... https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/418…

  25. comment
    Comment #13388869

    Here's an alternative to wrapping GPG, using .gnupg/gpg.conf: personal-cipher-preferences AES256 AES personal-digest-preferences SHA256 SHA512 personal-compress-preferences Uncompr…