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thijsr

HN member
Joined
Fri, Oct 16, 2020, 11:56 PM UTC
HN karma
191
Public activity
32 items

About thijsr

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Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #47254161

    I may be biased, but I do think it is a very fun talk (disclosure: I am the speaker)

  2. comment
    Comment #46972132

    A digital euro is intended to the the digital equivalent of cash. It is issued directly by the central bank. Currently, consumers cannot have an account at the central bank. They h…

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    Comment #46446106

    We've only verified EC2 during our research, but you do make a good point here. Nitro wasn't vulnerable. Firecracker might have been, considering that it is also built on top of KV…

  4. comment
    Comment #46442645

    Hi, author here. Thanks for posting this! I gave a talk yesterday at the 39th Chaos Communication Congress in Hamburg that goes into detail about how the vulnerability works [1]. S…

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    Comment #46154161

    > I also don't love enums for errors because it means adding any new error type will be a breaking change You can annotate your error enum with #[non_exhaustive], then it will not …

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    Comment #45329521

    Scientific papers have an abstract, which already serves as a short summary.

  7. comment
    Comment #45304086

    This is a project that we've been working in collaboration with Google and AWS. We present a vulnerability that allows a malicious virtual machine to leak all physical memory of it…

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    Comment #45156212

    When you can modify the microcode of a CPU, you can modify the behaviour of the RDRAND/RDSEED instructions. For example, using EntrySign [1] on AMD, you can make RDRAND to always r…

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    Comment #44578836

    Rowhammer is an inherent problem to the way we design DRAM. It is a known problem to memory manufacturers that is very hard, if not impossible, to fix. In fact, Rowhammer only beco…

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    Comment #43977356

    As far as I am aware, the course material is not public. Practical assignments are an integral part of the courses given by the VUSEC group, and unfortunately those are difficult t…

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    Comment #42857318

    Disabling SMT alone isn’t enough to mitigate CPU vulnerabilities. For full protection against issues like L1TF or MDS, you must both enable the relevant mitigations and disable SMT…

  15. comment
    Comment #42856457

    It depends on your threat model. If you don't run any untrusted code on your hardware (including Javascript), you can safely disable the mitigations. If you do run untrusted code, …

  16. comment
    Comment #42856397

    From the FAQ: > While FLOP has an actionable mitigation, implementing it requires patches from software vendors and cannot be done by users. Apple has communicated to us that they …

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    Comment #39166761

    RowHammer is not a thing of the past. In fact, modern DRAM chips are significantly more susceptible to RowHammer due to their increased chip density [1]. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/…

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    Comment #35143869

    The paragraph right after says > Additionally, organizations may have their own billing information associated with the org itself. They can use this to sponsor the accounts of the…

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    Comment #33327648

    They have a status page for the WhatsApp Business API at https://metastatus.com/whatsapp-business-api It currently shows major disruptions.

  25. comment
    Comment #30919840

    Yes, the CPU self-reported power usage is indeed fairly noisy. We've tried to mitigate this by executing certain tests multiple times in a row, and using the average power consumpt…