Viewing profile — tehryanx

Pedant here. Using "for instance" here implies that you will be providing an example of how begging the question and raising the question are not the same thing. You've provided a …

It makes a lot of sense to use an MCP for git and everything else if you want observability across many users. It gives you a place to shim security controls, monitoring, and alert…

I find it even more fascinating that a few of them aren't.

I know you're right that there's a saturation point for context size, but it's not just context size that the larger models have, it's better grounding within that as a result of s…

newer models have larger context windows, and more stable reasoning across larger context windows. If you point your model directly at the thing you want it to assess, and it doesn…

I get what you're saying, but I think this is still missing something pretty critical. The smaller models can recognize the bug when they're looking right at it, that seems to be v…

I first mirrored these in the early 2000s because I was worried it would eventually vanish. my mirror has been gone for decades, and the original survives. :)

where is anthropic hyping like that? Most of what I see coming out of anthropic is deep context releases on research they're doing.

The real problem here is that this is now the only way the maintainer/reporter can reasonably work. Proving out a security vulnerability from beginning to end is often very difficu…

Rolling your own browser is 10x more dangerous than rolling your own auth or crypto. Building on top of chromium is a good thing here.

Yes it does. He's refuting that in this part of the post: > When they finally did reply, they seem to have developed some sort of theory that I was interested in “access to PII”, w…

based on the description, I think it's using something similar to GLAN https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.13064

this feels like a hundred accidents waiting to happen.

Forgive me for belaboring, but I think we're talking past each other a bit. I do understand that in your model the LLM can't send anything unsafe through to the rest of the system.…

Personally, I think there's a piece missing in the analogy. I understand that you can put some kind of human-verified mediator in between the LLM and the tool its calling to make s…

Assuming you feed everything into another context to make safe, doesn't the problem just come with it? Why can't the LLM propagate misbehaviour into that stage?

It really concerns me that this is an afterthought rather than MVP table stakes.

I don't think it is beyond the scope of MCP. Browsers have controls to prevent cross-origin data exposures, and this protocol is designed to bridge origins across a context that th…

Sure, but the leak risk is happening in a place outside the site's control. If the purpose of the MCP-B tool on mail.com is to summarize your email, then the site needs to allow th…

I appreciate your responses here. The thing that still really stands out to me as a completely novel risk in this framework is that the extension is automatically seeking out and a…

sandboxing is a general term for actor isolation, and its context agnostic. For example, when you use the sandbox attribute on an iframe in a web application, it's not the user tha…

I do think the threat model here is a bit unique though. If I'm running two MCP servers on my machine, I'm the one that installed them, I'm the one that assigned what permissions t…