Viewing profile — swordswinger12

I don't really understand the threat model in which this provides a real security benefit. If someone can inspect the contents of memory, can't they also recover the encryption key…

Zadie Smith's essays are tremendous. I highly recommend her earlier collection "Changing My Mind".

AEZ uses a non-standard AES variant in a sui generis fashion; as a result some people have called its security into question: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/832.pdf Point being, its …

Ah, thanks for the reply Tony. This would indeed prevent the problem I described. Kinda curious about the downvotes, since tptacek's original comment suggested nothing like CHAIN o…

>you can almost always delegate that kind of interface up one layer in your application stack and pass AES-SIV chunks of messages. Without additional precautions this approach is v…

Does anyone know if the IOTA devs ever wrote down a justification for using a hand-rolled hash instead of, like, SHA-256? If so, can you link it in a comment? EDIT: I feel compelle…

The short answer is yes. There are some (slow) ways to fix this: https://people.csail.mit.edu/nickolai/papers/goldwasser-we.p...

All FHE schemes can run a full-blown virtual machine, but you might not live long enough to see Ubuntu finish booting up.

I may have missed something in the whitepaper, but using a confidentiality-only encryption scheme like AES-CTR seems bad because it enables trivial attacks on file integrity (bit-f…

The author incorrectly calling them "elliptical curves" is like nails on a chalkboard. An "elliptical" is an exercise machine or an adjective used to describe something shaped like…

You're letting your modern biases color how you view Tacitus' writings. Most people educated in the last ~hundred years or so were taught "history" as you understand it - an impart…

Can you explain how you would use FHE instead of garbled circuits in the Arx range query data structure? I don't see how that would work - wouldn't you have to (re-)introduce inter…

TFHE is not even in the same galaxy as CryptDB. Comparing the two is like comparing an apple and a 2007 Honda Civic. They're polar opposite approaches to executing queries on encry…

Fully homomorphic encryption isn't tremendously useful for database queries - you end up having to put the entire database in a massive FHE ciphertext, then expressing the query as…

This paper is a fairly convincing counter-argument to another recent work ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03501 ) on physical adversarial examples for autonomous vehicles. The other p…

This isn't for lack of trying on the part of cryptographers - unconditional proofs of security for most modern cryptosystems would imply that P and NP are separate. For example, a …

There needs to be a word to describe the practice of arrogantly explaining a researcher's own results back to them on HN. Maybe HNsplaining?

The failures of the academic cryptography community to provide solutions to real-world problems in general are well-documented, and I will not belabor them here (q.v. Rogaway's "Th…

Another really interesting potential benefit of this work is enabling users to create longer, more complicated passwords. The idea is that if users are less encumbered by typos and…

To be clear: nowhere in this paper did we claim any particular solution is useless. However, the degree to which these systems are useful, and what situations they are useful for, …

If your threat model is having a hard disk stolen, simply using full-disk encryption or whatever Redis offers is probably fine. Fair warning, though: this is a really weak threat m…

It's worth pointing out that trusted execution for individual queries does not, in general, rule out the attacks discussed in this paper. If the database collects (for example) fre…

The original goal of the academic "encrypted database" proposals like CryptDB was security against this kind of adversary. The idea was that if all the data is encrypted even when …