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sleevi

HN member
Joined
Fri, Sep 21, 2012, 3:36 AM UTC
HN karma
454
Public activity
68 items

About sleevi

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Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #44494951

    All the time. Many CA distrust events involved some degree of “amateurs” reporting issues. While I hesitate to call commenters like agwa an amateur, it certainly was not profession…

  2. comment
    Comment #38920425

    Because it wasn’t actually a server misconfiguration, nor was it, as others have speculated, about Postel’s Law. The way X.509 was designed - to the very first version - was the no…

  3. comment
    Comment #38185960

    Because this is not the “start of drafting” but roughly “final text that is largely a rubber stamp approval.” This is the output of having been through the the trilogue process - w…

  4. comment
    Comment #38185905

    > and the recent legislation coming from there seems very inspired by the great firewall. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/6487...

  5. comment
    Comment #37012369

    The EU is currently proposing to mandate the inclusion of roots that have been government approved, and to limit browsers from removing/distrusting them without notice/approval. ht…

  6. comment
    Comment #29260451

    It’s actually a huge issue - look at how eliminating a key difficulty in obtaining certificates massively increased HTTPS adoption (via LetsEncrypt and others) Similarly, automatio…

  7. comment
    Comment #29258633

    Yes, the current regulation is targeted at government sites authenticating citizens, but the goal with these revisions is to require VLOPs to support this, along with allowing them…

  8. comment
    Comment #29258602

    The QWACs can be issued by anyone who meets the minimum requirements, which are substantially less than those required for TLS server CAs in browsers. So while it’s true that banks…

  9. comment
    Comment #29257111

    The proposed regulation requires that QWACs MUST be accepted and recognized as such, such as using the European List of Trusted Lists as part of the root store. That is, if a QWAC …

  10. comment
    Comment #29257056

    One element that results in less security is that it becomes more difficult to replace. For example, QWACs cannot legally be automated (e.g. via ACME), because of certain restricti…

  11. comment
    Comment #29256994

    Yes. It requires the EU Trustmark, a logo designed through a secondary-school competition, to be displayed with certain colors and sizing, as directed through Implementing Acts (wh…

  12. comment
    Comment #29256952

    The draft revisions actually propose such authentication to be mandatory to implement for service providers if their users would like to use it. That is, it specifically targets we…

  13. comment
    Comment #29256896

    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A20...

  14. story
  15. comment
    Comment #28249985

    Do you have links to documentation on the Apple Pay requirement? That sounds like Apple Pay is encouraging certificate pinning, and I suspect the Apple Root Program may have opinio…

  16. comment
    Comment #28080721

    As others have noted, many of these issues are fundamental to XML DSig, which is insecure by design. [1] However, the “what does the future hold” of OIDC is not much brighter. OIDC…

  17. comment
    Comment #27111842

    Example app: NuGet for .NET on Linux and MacOS, from Microsoft: https://github.com/NuGet/Announcements/issues/56 It used SSL/TLS and S/MIME roots to verify code signing and timesta…

  18. comment
    Comment #26877270

    Using (defined) properties of the TLS ClientHello to determine how the server will respond. For example, changing the certificate used based on the ALPN identity, the SNI server ho…

  19. comment
    Comment #25289033

    No more related to Android than any other Chrome supported OS. The post linked in the article, https://g.co/chrome/root-policy makes it clear: the goal is to provide a consistent, …

  20. comment
    Comment #25288966

    https://cloud.google.com/docs/chrome-enterprise/policies?pol... There’s more that could be said, but I can see this is an emotionally loaded subject for you, so perhaps it’s best d…

  21. comment
    Comment #25285870

    Some of this isn’t correct (e.g. Firefox totally reads HKCU - https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manage... - which is necessary to work with AV ), but I’ll the t…

  22. comment
    Comment #25285132

    Happy to be up front here: as we call out in https://g.co/chrome/root-policy , the goal is to support the things the user installed and authorized. The priority of constituencies f…

  23. comment
    Comment #25284991

    No, that’s not it: none of the code has landed yet It’s a big enough change that we’re explaining before landing. We’re taking an approach similar to Firefox’s implementation ( htt…

  24. comment
    Comment #25284511

    https://g.co/chrome/root-policy , which is linked to in that mail, states in the third paragraph: > If you’re an enterprise managing trusted CAs for your organization, including lo…

  25. comment
    Comment #25284501

    The overlay is only used by Chrome on ChromeOS (the doc goes into some of the details there), so effectively, the “Chrome OS” root store is being sunset. On a practical, technical …