Viewing profile — sangel

This is the entire formal verification effort, as far as I can tell: https://codeberg.org/gregburd/aether/src/branch/main/aether/... They use TLA+ with TLC which model checks the w…

My totally uneducated guess is that they leak exaggerated numbers on purpose to make the real numbers look less bad in comparison. The idea being that a few days before the officia…

Obviously not. Suppose the input to my function is a 64-bit integer. My test cannot possibly try every possible 64-bit integer. It would take years for such a test to finish. This …

Very inefficient. Like wildly so. Specifically if you have a very small database and you preprocess it with their techniques, the resulting database is petabytes in size. But the r…

At least in my department, this will not work as long as the applicant's supervisor or dissertation committee members are still in the department. The crux of the issue, in my mind…

This is strange to me. Many universities, including mine, avoid interviewing applicants with a PhD or postdoc from the same institution to which they are applying.

This is basically what we did in our project: https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~sga001/papers/pung-osdi16.pdf . We never built it into a product because we couldn't figure out a way to mo…

From my experience your first number is off by 3X and sometimes more depending on the university. But yes, you make less as a professor than you do in industry.

They are called PIR with sublinear online computation or offline/online PIR. Key idea is the client issues a query that is independent of what they really want. This is the “offlin…

High risk compared to what? The alternative is absolutely no privacy (status quo) or no/limited functionality (not very useful). Seems like strictly better than having no privacy.

You can formally verify all the way to C, C#, Haskell, or even assembly if you use tools like Dafny, Coq, or Vale (for verified assembly). Several projects do this. It’s a lot of w…

Non interactive zero knowledge allows one proof to be checked by many verifiers. I think folks would still consider that to be a zero knowledge proof no? That said, yeah this hashi…

This hasn’t really been my experience at all. I find students at my university (an ivy) to be pretty reasonable and only complain if there is a mistake during grading. In that case…

It is 40 degrees F right now… in mid May. And has been all month and basically all year since last November. I don’t see how you can call that good temperature.

I don't know if the allegations in this antitrust are true or not. However, about a decade ago I wrote a paper ( https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~sga001/papers/vex-sigcomm13.pdf ) discus…

I think this requires assuming H is a random oracle, no? Suppose H(s||k) is a collision-resistant hash function. Let's build another CRHF from H as follows: H'(s || k) = H(s || k) …

You are right. I'm missing an H at the end. You first compare target-digest with all endpoints. If it's a match with any of them, good. Then you know a pre-image is in that column.…

The table looks like this: Column 1 Column 2 start-text1 start-text2 last-hash1 last-hash2 You only store the start text and the last hash for each column. consists of a mix of pas…

How would you compare this toolkit to something like SEAL? Are there particular selling points or things that I should be aware as a potential user?

ah, this is indeed quite neat. thanks for sharing.

I think you are a bit confused. They are very different in what they guarantee. The goal of MPC is to hide the inputs of the program. But it is okay for an adversary to make all so…

> *sender anonymity Sender anonymity means that the server (or any recipient) cannot determine who sent a particular message. In your example, the centralized server absolutely kno…

I'm not sure that I agree with your point. DC networks (see David Chaum's work and also Dissent by Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford) have no centralized components and provide stronger anon…