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royce

HN member
Joined
Mon, Feb 18, 2008, 9:31 PM UTC
HN karma
77
Public activity
55 items

About royce

techsolvency.com/roycewilliams

@TychoTithonus@infosec.exchange

[ my public key: https://keybase.io/royce; my proof: https://keybase.io/royce/sigs/P6FdliUdxVFgzdkLyNQ9znil63lGBFzZSFriZh1tDbY ]

Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #46341542

    The rest of the snark/ bitterness aside ... NTP takes latency as a constraint, and accommodates for it. And far from a disgrace, NTP was a brilliant design for its time, and has pr…

  2. comment
    Comment #41653249

    Someone seems to have dropped the "EXCEPT EUROPA" part. ;)

  3. comment
    Comment #40919107

    I work in telco, too - by my read, they're not disagreeing: Although Diameter was intended to replace RADIUS, the protocol itself offers no security when used over TCP. As a result…

  4. comment
    Comment #40918551

    The paper https://www.blastradius.fail/pdf/radius.pdf ) explicitly states DIAMETER "never replaced RADIUS for many common use cases" and "the protocol itself offers no security whe…

  5. comment
    Comment #40916057

    CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-3596 Nothing on oss-security list yet, but it'll appear here: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/09/ E…

  6. comment
    Comment #38636150

    Naively, would there be any value in providing an RSS feed of new adds, date changes, etc. ?

  7. comment
    Comment #37841131

    "[PATCH] socks: return error if hostname too long for remote resolve Prior to this change the state machine attempted to change the remote resolve to a local resolve if the hostnam…

  8. comment
    Comment #33242565

    That's an entirely different threat model. hotpotamus is right - the article, and the threat model, are about offline attack of back-end password hashes , after they've been stolen…

  9. comment
    Comment #29885253

    Being able to firmly reject all unauthenticated messages is still the target end state. The risk of a threat actor sending an email that looks completely legit, and simply asking t…

  10. comment
    Comment #29558103

    Site author here. Thanks for helping to get the word out - every bit may help someone. While I consider my page to provide useful color, and I validate and summarize and cache info…

  11. comment
    Comment #28980511

    Am I the only one who thinks this sounds a lot like how pyramid schemes work?

  12. comment
    Comment #21299608

    It's now been cracked - and now we know why it took so long: https://minnie.tuhs.org/pipermail/tuhs/2019-October/019124.h...

  13. comment
    Comment #21265993

    It depends on the organization. Some larger financial institutions are sometimes more likely - or even bound by internal policy - to simply trigger their standard card-cancellation…

  14. comment
    Comment #21254689

    Or Alaska or Hawaii - same problem (shipping restrictions invisible until checkout). It's insane. They know exactly where I live.

  15. comment
    Comment #21211426

    The superset of all of the original CSRG-shipped cracking-eligible descrypt hashes is actually about 1400 hashes, drawn from a slightly smaller number of overlapping accounts among…

  16. comment
    Comment #19334544

    I'm startled that there's no mention of app whitelisting yet. Code signing reduces ops overhead and latency in environments that are using app whitelisting. If the code is signed, …

  17. comment
    Comment #18172645

    Yep, that was exactly why (or at least, very strong circumstantial evidence): https://productforums.google.com/d/msg/websearch/H4XbbwWmtAY... I don't think it was ever officially a…

  18. comment
    Comment #18169527

    Now that Google+ is going away, can we have the +string operator back in Google Search, to force inclusion of a single string (instead of having to use double quotes)?

  19. comment
    Comment #17946772

    For us (early regional ISP, mid-'90s), a lack of separate per-service hostnames caused significant scaling fragility. In the initial rollout, all services were served from a single…

  20. comment
    Comment #17625495

    If someone is developing web applications in such a way that they need support from their browser vendor to make them work properly ... they're doing it wrong.

  21. comment
    Comment #16443657

    What about the other case - when they're not random, but also not reused ... such that the psychology of the user's password-selection methodology might be exposed?

  22. comment
    Comment #16443638

    Just because the horse is out of the barn doesn't mean that the owner of the barn knows about it yet.

  23. comment
    Comment #16443627

    > What does that buy you, if they are in plain text? Nothing. That's why I was agreeing with you for that subset. But N may be smaller than you might think, when frequency data is …

  24. comment
    Comment #16443451

    > Shadowed password files may as well store passwords in cleartext; if those passwords are not reused anywhere, the situation is safe Wait, what? If they were randomly generated an…

  25. comment
    Comment #16443249

    Random passphrases are indeed a good idea. XKCD #936 advocates for 4 words randomly selected from a 6000-word dictionary, which is 6000^4, or ~1.296 × 10^15, which isn't actually t…