Viewing profile — remosi
remosi
HN member- Joined
- Wed, Jan 05, 2011, 3:16 PM UTC
- HN karma
- 132
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- 32 items
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About remosi
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Recent public activity
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Comment #11484713
(I'm a Google SRE, I'm on the team that dealt with this outage) This did impact common infrastructure. Some (non-cloud) Google services were impacted. We've spent years working on …
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Comment #7664398
Nine days ago the data protection authority (DPA) in Hamburg, Germany asked to audit the WiFi data that our Street View cars collect for use in location-based products like Google …
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Comment #7664317
> We don't correlate or combine information from our temporary or permanent logs with any personal information that you have provided Google for other services. -- https://develope…
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Comment #7583580
https://www.lorier.net/docs/tpm are my notes with experimenting with the TPM in my T530. The trick is that the TPM will protect itself fairly aggressively, so before you start turn…
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Comment #7583398
Your content is often not in the webservers user, it's often stored in a SQL or NoSQL database somewhere. Various access controls can be applied there. But your right, unfortunatel…
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Comment #7583341
This would be ideal. One of the problems with heartbleed has been that while you can revoke your cert and mint a new one, browsers don't check CRLs so they'll continue to trust the…
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Comment #7583320
But not out of user. If I can run code as your user, I can attempt to retrieve those keys, although I assume MacOS prevents you from attaching a debugger to the keychain. Linux has…
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Comment #7583301
Having looked at PKCS#11, I'm not sure what bits you could get away with not implementing. It does have functions for things like "get random bytes", which I guess you might not wa…
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Comment #7583009
Yup, that pretty much sums it up. I'm currently trying to figure out if dbus could be that serialisation since it takes care of a reasonable amount of the hard work for you. But I'…
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Comment #7582881
Yup. But when you have a successful attack you should consider what alternatives you have to make sure that never happens again. You might dismiss them since their cost:benefit mig…
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Comment #7582864
The technique of not having the keys available to the process that's dealing in external bits works really well for DNSSEC. There's a program called opendnssec which takes care of …
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Comment #7582774
If I was running a bank, I'd hopefully use a proper HSM. You ask it to generate a private key, you then ask it for the public key, get it signed into a cert, and use that. The HSM …
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Comment #7582738
The major reason is that when your website becomes popular, and becomes more of a target, you can swap out the software hsm daemon with a more sophisticated hardware solution, if i…
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Comment #7582713
It runs in process tho, so it would have had the exact same result with heartbleed. Its keys need to be readable to that user, so exploits like http://blog.detectify.com/post/82370…
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Comment #7582694
Yeah, I was aware of factotum when I wrote this post. GNOME uses p11-kit (which is a wrapper around PKCS#11) and gnome-keyring to kinda provide similar functionality.
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Comment #7582689
You're right, this doesn't solve 100% of the problem. If I could solve 100% I'd be creating a startup... Cookies are remarkably sensitive, but they can be far more easily rotated. …
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Comment #7582671
There are several softhsm's, they just share the address space with your frontline daemon which (IMHO) defeats the purpose. While webserver's support for PKCS#11 is annoying, it's …
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Comment #6431893
DNS can give you IPs for things close by, or far away. 8.8.8.8 uses EDNS0 Client Subnet to try and improve which IP address you get served back.
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Comment #6427739
Where in the world are you? Do you have a traceroute to 8.8.8.8?
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Comment #6348460
Includes in the output: Server public key is 2048 bit ... Protocol : TLSv1.2 Cipher : ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (ie: not RC4, as long as your client supports non RC4 ciphers, use…
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Comment #6189257
So, reading many of the replies in this thread, they all cover good points, but I have a slightly different point: The current encryption libraries make the "easy" stuff hard. If w…
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Comment #6157253
That was why I wrote it yes. I wanted to know how I could ask android phones politely to avoid slamming the bandwidth on an AP that really didn't have the backhaul for everyone's p…
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Comment #6157243
There are complications, some IP's might be free, some might be cheap (caches, local peering), some might be expensive (transit). The price might vary on time of day (a lot of eyeb…
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Comment #6157229
Well, this scheme at least lets you announce "This is an (relatively) expensive connection, please avoid doing things you don't need to.".