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Viewing profile — redrabbyte

redrabbyte

HN member
Joined
Thu, Mar 30, 2017, 3:32 PM UTC
HN karma
18
Public activity
17 items

About redrabbyte

researcher for coresec@tugraz

Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #40069294

    concurrent work ( https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2401/2401.04349.pdf ) has shown website fingerprinting, recognizing something like the static login page of youtube/google/face…

  2. comment
    Comment #40064960

    It's always hard to communicate fairly academic side channels in a way that the audience of a press-release (which is typically anyone) can get any level of detail. We tried to wal…

  3. comment
    Comment #40064894

    Hi, the line about "failed" attacks pertains to the attack on AMD, Nvidia worked fine ;)

  4. comment
    Comment #22557067

    besides drm stuff like netflix (don't know if it's back breaking there), virtually none, of course unless someone publishes a very practical attack from userspace, I don't think th…

  5. comment
    Comment #22540666

    short version: only the lower bits of an address are compared at first, because the rest might take a while to resolve so the cpu can speculate that the rest is gonna match as well…

  6. comment
    Comment #22540649

    it's fairly easy (with the available publications) once you have the prerequisites: a compromised operating system which is of course exactly what sgx is supposed to defend against…

  7. comment
    Comment #22540607

    there are some (non-optimal) estimates in the paper, tl;dr it's not great ;) some more technical info here https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insigh...

  8. comment
    Comment #22540313

    not really / update / no, unless you rely on sgx to protect high value data

  9. comment
    Comment #22540296

    it affects all loads, but for sgx the attacker scenario is that you have compromised the OS, which makes it significantly easier to create the conditions (faults/microcode assists)…

  10. comment
    Comment #22540237

    he happens to be an author/co-author of all of those papers ;)

  11. comment
    Comment #19924957

    there's a foreshadow-ng variant specifically for vms, and it's arguably the worst

  12. comment
    Comment #19924896

    verification wouldn't catch any of this, the processors operate correctly on an architectural level most of this seems to be behaving as intended, they just didn't foresee the side…

  13. comment
    Comment #19924393

    the inclusivity types don't really play a role in these types of attack (until you get to a very practical stage where this might matter), not least because there are other sidecha…

  14. comment
    Comment #14000443

    I guess you could call it an evolution, because memory deduplication is not always enabled anymore (research like this might have played a role here ;) he talks about that @35:27 i…

  15. comment
    Comment #13997057

    I suspect this might also make you smile then ;) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yPZmiRi_c-o&feature=youtu.be , if you haven't seen it already

  16. comment
    Comment #13996885

    If there are no more shared cache sets between VMs, then yes, it's dead ofc I would suspect if one VM would like to be separated from the others in terms of cache sets, the others …

  17. comment
    Comment #13996256

    not that hard, but keep in mind the current limitations on supported cpus