Viewing profile — redrabbyte
redrabbyte
HN member- Joined
- Thu, Mar 30, 2017, 3:32 PM UTC
- HN karma
- 18
- Public activity
- 17 items
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About redrabbyte
Recent public activity
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Comment #40069294
concurrent work ( https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2401/2401.04349.pdf ) has shown website fingerprinting, recognizing something like the static login page of youtube/google/face…
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Comment #40064960
It's always hard to communicate fairly academic side channels in a way that the audience of a press-release (which is typically anyone) can get any level of detail. We tried to wal…
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Comment #40064894
Hi, the line about "failed" attacks pertains to the attack on AMD, Nvidia worked fine ;)
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Comment #22557067
besides drm stuff like netflix (don't know if it's back breaking there), virtually none, of course unless someone publishes a very practical attack from userspace, I don't think th…
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Comment #22540666
short version: only the lower bits of an address are compared at first, because the rest might take a while to resolve so the cpu can speculate that the rest is gonna match as well…
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Comment #22540649
it's fairly easy (with the available publications) once you have the prerequisites: a compromised operating system which is of course exactly what sgx is supposed to defend against…
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Comment #22540607
there are some (non-optimal) estimates in the paper, tl;dr it's not great ;) some more technical info here https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insigh...
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Comment #22540313
not really / update / no, unless you rely on sgx to protect high value data
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Comment #22540296
it affects all loads, but for sgx the attacker scenario is that you have compromised the OS, which makes it significantly easier to create the conditions (faults/microcode assists)…
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Comment #22540237
he happens to be an author/co-author of all of those papers ;)
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Comment #19924957
there's a foreshadow-ng variant specifically for vms, and it's arguably the worst
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Comment #19924896
verification wouldn't catch any of this, the processors operate correctly on an architectural level most of this seems to be behaving as intended, they just didn't foresee the side…
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Comment #19924393
the inclusivity types don't really play a role in these types of attack (until you get to a very practical stage where this might matter), not least because there are other sidecha…
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Comment #14000443
I guess you could call it an evolution, because memory deduplication is not always enabled anymore (research like this might have played a role here ;) he talks about that @35:27 i…
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Comment #13997057
I suspect this might also make you smile then ;) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yPZmiRi_c-o&feature=youtu.be , if you haven't seen it already
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Comment #13996885
If there are no more shared cache sets between VMs, then yes, it's dead ofc I would suspect if one VM would like to be separated from the others in terms of cache sets, the others …
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Comment #13996256
not that hard, but keep in mind the current limitations on supported cpus