Viewing profile — nextgens

The original freenet design was replicating content as it was requested. You had no way of locating "all" the copies as they would get cached "along the way" elsewhere on the keysp…

Thank you for the downvotes. You're moving the debate here. The question was "How are the goals different?" from the project leader (who ought to know better), not whether moving t…

You're getting this wrong. He has forked the project (to something that does not share the same goals so "fork" is arguable here), took the name, the cash and the goodwill. We went…

I've abstained form interfering until now... but have you honestly forgotten? Please explain how "the new freenet" tackles censorship resistance. https://web.archive.org/web/200010…

Meshcore's crypto is interesting. ECB, issues with key generation, key negotiation, seldom authenticated data, ... It definitely works better than MT but please stop lauding it for…

TLS1.0 introduced modularity via the concept of "extensions". It's everything but a minor evolution of the protocol. One of the many things it brought is session tickets, enabling …

TLS1.0 introduced modularity via the concept of "extensions". It's everything but a minor evolution of the protocol.

It would be great if Google supported rfc8414 and rfc7591. Right now most MUAs hardcode credentials instead of auto-discovering/registering/configuring them and decline to implemen…

As one of the maintainers of Mailu, I'd say use Mailu! Why? three main reasons: (a) security (as you have identified isolation matters, but that is not the only thing), (b) get the…

Mailu is a simple yet full-featured mail server as a set of Docker images. It is free software (both as in free beer and as in free speech), open to suggestions and external contri…

No, and it doesn't protect the privacy of the viewer either!

Mailu - a mail server as a set of Docker images.

Sure you can defeat it using specialized tools... but at that point, you are far from "all I need is a pen" and opportunistic attacks. The tool will have to match the width of the …

Yes, we're talking about an attack against the zipper (and not the zip tie nor the bag) The goal here is tamper evidence... sure you can open the bag through the zipper but you won…

Use the zip-tie to "anchor" the slider too... that will defeat the pen trick.

What's the shortest chain-size that those free CAs can offer (assuming android>=5.0 devices)? It would be great to have a tool somewhere that matches client handshakes & supported …

The answer is complicated. IMHO It's clearly better than no TPM... as for whether it's better or worse than a physical chip, it's a different trade-off. One one side you have: - hi…

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIPS_140-2#Level_2 It definitely does when there is no attempt made at protecting against it. L2 means "tamper evidence", you need L3 for things to st…

What I'm argueing in my talk is that it shouldn't be. Odds are your phone does it better :) Decaping a chip from a lost laptop is far from science fiction and can be performed at a…

The PIN isn't required if you decap the TPM.

It's amazing that you disregard the most basic attack in your threat model ( https://safeboot.dev/threats/ ): going after the TPM itself. TPMs are usually FIPS 140-2 L2: not someth…