Viewing profile — moyix

They actually removed the temperature parameter starting with GPT-5.

I think you're confusing CVEs and vulnerabilities here? Mozilla (per their longstanding practice) grouped multiple vulnerabilities found internally under a small number of CVEs.

On hardened targets and Firecracker specifically, here's a recent vulnerability found by "Anthropic": https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-015-... Unfortunately …

It's limiting from the PoV of a developer who wants to ensure that their own code is free of all security issues. It is not limiting from the point of view of an attacker who just …

This is true for a lot of things but for low-level code you can always fall back to "the intention is to not violate memory safety".

Also, unlike OpenAI, Anthropic's prompt caching is explicit (you set up to 4 cache "breakpoints"), meaning if you don't implement caching then you don't benefit from it.

There is filtering mentioned, it's just not done by a human: > I have written up the verification process I used for the experiments here, but the summary is: an exploit tends to i…

Note that MuZero did better than AlphaGo, without access to preprogrammed rules: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MuZero

There's also a FIDO standard in the works for how to export passkeys: https://blog.1password.com/fido-alliance-import-export-passk...

The main difference is that all of the vulnerabilities reported here are real, many quite critical (XXE, RCE, SQLi, etc.). To be fair there were definitely a lot of XSS, but the ma…

All of these reports came with executable proof of the vulnerabilities – otherwise, as you say, you get flooded with hallucinated junk like the poor curl dev. This is one of the th…

Wait a sec, I thought they were optional? > White Paper/Slide Deck/Supporting Materials (optional) > • If you have a completed white paper or draft, slide deck, or other supporting…

Yeah, it's been very strange being on the other side of that after 10 years in academia! But it's totally reasonable for people to be skeptical when there's a bunch of money sloshi…

This is discussed in the post – many came down to individual programs' policies e.g. not accepting the vulnerability if it was in a 3rd party product they used (but still hosted by…

We've got a bunch of agent traces on the front page of the web site right now. We also have done writeups on individual vulnerabilities found by the system, mostly in open source r…

You should come to my upcoming BlackHat talk on how we did this while avoiding false positives :D https://www.blackhat.com/us-25/briefings/schedule/#ai-agents...

I made a CTF challenge based on that lovely feature of select() :D You could use the out-of-bounds bitset memory corruption to flip bits in an RSA public key in a way that made it …

With security vulnerabilities, you don't give the agent the ability to modify the potentially vulnerable software, naturally. Instead you make them do what an attacker would have t…

He did do exactly what you say – except right after that, while reviewing the outputs, he found that it had also discovered a different 0day.

One thing that is interesting is that this was anticipated by the OpenAI Codex paper (which led to GitHub Copilot) all the way back in 2021: > Users might be more inclined to accep…

I think the usual name is "overlay". At least, that's what Tim Gowers called the one he started :) https://gowers.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/discrete-analysis-an...

I'm a bit confused, or maybe I've been doing it wrong. DEI-related things don't usually go in Broader Impacts, do they? When I've written grants, Broader Impacts was just generally…

We've been using them to find novel vulnerabilities in open source web apps. The past 4 posts here have details: - Auth bypass/arbitrary file read in Scoold: https://xbow.com/blog/…