Viewing profile — mmalone

Just to clarify, are you describing EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS wrapping PEAP? I'm still learning a lot of this stuff... but, my understanding is that PEAP doesn't do TLS but TTLS + PEAP …

You can roll your own with https://github.com/smallstep/certificates . We maintain major open source projects and contribute a lot to other projects. I don’t think that means every…

Correct.

Well... the title is hyperbolic (as titles are wont to be), but the goal was to configure Wifi that aligns with the CNSA Suite[1] / CNSSP 15[2], which I think is fair to call "NSA-…

I work at smallstep. For home wifi this is totally overkill. Better security is always nice but, in this case, there's a significant usability & interop tradeoff for home use (thou…

I work at smallstep. Yes. This also works with FreeRadius! We decided to integrate RADIUS into our product since setting up FreeRadius is complicated and, if you're just doing EAP-…

I work at Smallstep. In this case you're getting an industrial-grade CA with a properly managed private key, etc. Still, fair. We usually include warnings about this, but looks lik…

I work at smallstep. Not sure about the RADIUS server, but connections to the CA use TLS for SCEP and/or ACME DA so the CA root cert needs to be trusted for TLS. There may be some …

> For the use case cited -- blocking MAC spoofing, EAP-TLS doesn't quite solve it The idea would be to rely on the client certificate authentication and not use MAC filtering at al…

If you're doing EAP-TLS wouldn't the ARP attack you're describing fail at the client when it's unable to verify the RADIUS server's certificate?

What would happen if you tried to reconnect to the network and the AP didn't have the pre-shared key? Presumably, you'd prompt the user and ask them if they want to connect. This i…

It's a critique of OpenSSL, which also makes no attempt to think of user experience.

This is not a technical limitation though. It's a policy limitation. In theory, a name-constrained intermediate for `.example.com` has no more authority and poses no greater risk t…

I'm biased because I'm the founder of the company, but you should check out the certificate management toolchain (CA[1] and CLI[2]) we've built at smallstep. A big focus of the pro…

You can put "name constraints" on an intermediate that, in theory, can restrict the intermediate to only signing certs for a particular subdomain. In theory, name-constrained inter…

Also, the Web PKI model has no real granular authorization when it comes to which CA can issue for which domain. A trusted CA can issue for any domain. So if you TOFU in my CA to c…

Good question. I know you can add a root CA cert. I’m on iOS and don’t have an Android or ChromeOS device handy. I don’t see a way to remove a cert from Apple’s iOS trust store (se…

That is correct.

Yea you’re correct. They were forcing people to add a CA. So this was not a great example. I wouldn’t say the centralization of Web PKI is by design so much as it is (was?) by nece…

Neat. I had never heard of TLSA. I’ll also add that certificate transparency (CT) is another mechanism designed to mitigate malicious cert issuance by a CA. A CT log is an public, …

Firefox is the only browser that ships with a built-in trust store. Other browsers use your operating system’s trust store and you can add & remove trusted CA certs from that trust…

Pretty sure CAA is supposed to be enforced by CAs, not by browsers. So, for instance, Let's Encrypt should refuse to issue a cert for your domain if you have CAA setup for digicert…

See my response to superkuh elsewhere in this thread. This would introduce new problems and, overall, would probably make Web PKI worse.

Counterpoint: this is also a big problem with SSH. When a host key changes with SSH you'll get a "Host Key Verification Failure" that basically says "yo, the key I expected for thi…

I think TOFU would be really problematic for browsers & the Web PKI trust model. At this point Web PKI is dealing with attacks from nation-states and other advanced threats that en…