Viewing profile — longtermop

The biggest gap is AI doesn't have the ability to self-correct and self-learn like humans do. We're working on fixing that with parcle.ai/second-brain. Beta will be rolling out in …

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Every agentic system I see has the same hidden tax: the model keeps rereading the same context. Tickets, Slack threads, docs, customer history, database notes, runbooks, logs, prio…

This is great — manifest validation feels like the right “static” layer for the agentic web. One nuance: a lot of prompt-injection / tool-abuse issues happen at runtime , when the …

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Exciting to see Apple making agentic coding first-class. The "Xcode Intelligence" feature that pulls from docs and developer forums is powerful. One thing I'm curious about: as the…

This resonates—CI and code review are great for enforcing conventions on what the agent produces . But one gap I keep running into: production agents ingest untrusted content at ru…

Interesting approach — how are you thinking about security boundaries when aggregating context from multiple sources? Pulling in emails, docs, and chat history into one context win…

Good breakdown of the attack surface. Building on @stale-labs' point about injection - the article correctly identifies that the most dangerous vectors aren't direct user input. It…

Really appreciate the credential isolation approach here. The proxy pattern makes a lot of sense - keeping keys out of the agent's context entirely is the right call. This got me t…

The meta-problem ("who watches the watcher?") is real, but I think the framing shapes the answer. If you're building a second AI to monitor the first, you've just doubled your atta…

The microservices framing resonates but surfaces an interesting security question. In your orchestration example: research = await research_agent.call("Find Q3 earnings...") analys…

The low-quality AI PR problem is real, but there's an inverse issue that doesn't get enough attention: AI agents that review code are equally vulnerable. When an AI code reviewer o…

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Really nice approach using macOS native sandboxing! The deny-by-default with targeted allows for project folders is the right model. To answer your question about network sandboxin…

This is a thoughtful architecture. A few critiques and observations from implementing similar patterns: *On the cryptographic challenge-response (Section 5.2):* The HMAC-based veri…

Very cool project! The MCP surface area here (110 tools) is a great example of why tool-output validation is becoming critical. When an AI agent interacts with binary analysis tool…

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The vulnerability framing is like saying SQL injection was unfixable in 2005. Security and defense will always lag behind new technology shifts and platform shifts. Just like web s…