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Viewing profile — kpdemetriou

kpdemetriou

HN member
Joined
Mon, Jun 25, 2018, 8:00 PM UTC
HN karma
154
Public activity
25 items

About kpdemetriou

phil@backbone.dev

Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #43638941

    Unlike Dual_EC_DRBG, Bitcoin doesn't use suspicious unexplained constants - all major constants have clear justifications as far as I'm aware.

  2. comment
    Comment #43583503

    Cord is a deterministic serialization format built in Rust, designed for security-sensitive applications where consistent and unambiguous binary representations are essential. Many…

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    Comment #39975528

    I'm not sure what you mean - Minibone's entire purpose is to allow you to not trust the server with users' plaintext data. Naturally, you DO need to run Minibone in an environment …

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    Comment #39975379

    I'm curious, how do you imagine using it in Python?

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    Comment #39975375

    Think of it this way: if your database gets breached, your app won't leak user data if your users aren't all targeted by active attackers. It's not a substitute for transport secur…

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    Comment #39975352

    I'm one of the authors. We built Minibone as a community contribution because we realized how unnecessarily vulnerability-prone E2EE app development is today - after seeing app aft…

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    Comment #39975306

    The team behind this project (read: we) developed an expansive SDK for multi-user collaborative apps, including realtime docs. We use it to power many of the features of https://ba…

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    Comment #39975267

    In principle, yes. In practise it's not widely supported (yet). Here's a relevant blog post: https://levischuck.com/blog/2023-02-prf-webauthn

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    Comment #39975248

    One of the authors here. Streaming is actually in the works.

  11. comment
    Comment #39975243

    It's much more bare-bones. Minibone exposes a more approachable and misuse-resistant higher-level API including support for things like opportunistic key rotations and groundwork f…

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    Comment #37759360

    Re: BLAKE2, I'm not sure it's fair to say that BLAKE2 is more widely used overall. But I do agree BLAKE2 is a bit of an outlier in terms of adoption. I think part of the reason is …

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    Comment #37759180

    Implemented correctly, I agree the difference in security margin may not be too important. Otherwise, Serpent is more resistant to timing attacks. Weaknesses in implementation are …

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    Comment #37758682

    Absolutely, but NIST ultimately choose the winners, giving them the option to pick (non-obviously) weak/weaker algorithms. Historically only the winners are adopted. Look at the AE…

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    Comment #37758628

    Bernstein is often right, despite the controversy around the Gimli permutation. In this particular case it's worth noting that neither BSI (Germany) nor NLNCSA (The Netherlands) re…

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    Comment #37642778

    Assuming the cryptography is solid (big if), you primarily have to worry about end-device compromise or a supply chain attack. Is it the latter you're worried about?

  18. comment
    Comment #37642500

    The typical trajectory of VC-backed companies is one of the things that led us to develop Backbone[1]. We've opted to forego VC funding and the short-term benefits in entails to bu…

  19. comment
    Comment #36467629

    The impact of E2EE in the event of database compromises is a little under-rated because the conversation often centers around the maximalist targeted survaillenace threat model. Ye…

  20. comment
    Comment #36467557

    The web app case is unfortunately more hazardous: - You're also trusting a large population of Certificate Authorities (CAs), subject to the post-compromise implications of Certifi…

  21. comment
    Comment #36467393

    Regarding #3, you'll need to load the immutable URL, perhaps indirectly, from someplace that ultimately has a user-facing URL. If an attacker can modify content in transit, then th…

  22. comment
    Comment #33347326

    > Zero knowledge cloud > Data in our cloud is end to end encrypted so your credentials are never exposed to anyone but you. A few comments: 1. You might want to avoid calling this …

  23. comment
    Comment #27032334

    Hi everyone, OP here. Let me offer some background. fuuids are designed to be sortable and collision-free (for most practical purposes, details below) IDs within a 16-byte footprin…

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