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jy-tan

HN member
Joined
Sun, Aug 13, 2023, 4:46 PM UTC
HN karma
39
Public activity
21 items

About jy-tan

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Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #47859261

    I built Fence ( https://github.com/Use-Tusk/fence ) in Go, a lightweight process sandbox for CLI agents (or any command really) with filesystem and network restrictions. It's also …

  2. comment
    Comment #47468625

    I created a tool for this: https://github.com/Use-Tusk/fence Same thoughts - I wanted a "permission manager" that defines a set of policies agnostic to coding agents. It also comes…

  3. comment
    Comment #47468552

    I built Fence for this! https://github.com/Use-Tusk/fence fence -t code -- opencode

  4. comment
    Comment #47463984

    Agree, I find it hard to support them when the team is so obnoxious on X.

  5. comment
    Comment #46868631

    How does this compare with QMD ( https://github.com/tobi/qmd )?

  6. comment
    Comment #46769452

    Awesome, give it a spin and let me know if you have any feedback!

  7. comment
    Comment #46762207

    You can just install Fence in your deployed service (see the installation instructions in the README), then wrap the user command/script with `fence -t code `. It will probably wor…

  8. comment
    Comment #46761975

    Yes, Fence is designed for exactly this, the built-in `code` template already allowlists npm and PyPI registries: ``` fence -t code pip install requests fence -t code npm install e…

  9. comment
    Comment #46760438

    Fence works on macOS and Linux (the install script works for both platforms). I'll make that clearer in the README.

  10. comment
    Comment #46759794

    Unfortunately nested bubblewrap sandboxes don't work. When you run `fence flatpak run `, Fence creates a bwrap sandbox with its own user namespace, Flatpak then tries to create ano…

  11. comment
    Comment #46758443

    Hey! Yes, Fence was inspired by sandbox-runtime. Both use the same underlying OS primitives (sandbox-exec on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux) and proxy-based network filtering. Fence ad…

  12. comment
    Comment #46710775

    Thanks! And yeah, these are complementary layers. Fence is at the OS/network boundary, while API-level policies (endpoints, parameters, token budgets) need something that actually …

  13. comment
    Comment #46710644

    Yes, currently writes are deny-by-default, but reads are allow-by-default. The challenge is that most programs need read access to system paths (/lib, /usr, /etc, /proc) just to ru…

  14. comment
    Comment #46710496

    Fair point, it does raise the bar! The distinction I'm drawing is between "semi-trusted" and "actively malicious". Fence handles well supply-chain scripts that phone home, tools th…

  15. story
    Show HN: Fence – Sandbox CLI commands with network/filesystem restrictions

    Hi HN! Fence wraps any command in a sandbox that blocks network by default and restricts filesystem writes. Useful for running semi-trusted code (package installs, build scripts, u…

  16. comment
    Comment #46684567

    Thanks! Great question, we have a Transforms system that lets you define redaction rules (redact, mask, replace, or drop) using matchers with JSONPath support. Transforms are appli…

  17. comment
    Comment #46665113

    Currently Tusk Drift focuses on functional/regression testing - we mock outbound dependencies (DBs, external APIs) for determinism, so we're not measuring real-world performance ch…

  18. comment
    Comment #46660936

    Thank you!

  19. comment
    Comment #46660930

    Give it a spin and let us know what you think! :)

  20. story
    Show HN: Tusk Drift – Turn production traffic into API tests

    Hi HN! In the past few months my team and I have been working on Tusk Drift, a system that records real API traffic from your service, then replays those requests as deterministic …

  21. story