Viewing profile — jrtc27
jrtc27
HN member- Joined
- Wed, Feb 10, 2021, 3:08 PM UTC
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About jrtc27
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Recent public activity
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Comment #45234183
> Unfortunately, the time between free and revocation introduces a short-but-not-zero window for UAF bugs/attacks. This time gap is even explicitly acknowledged in the Reloaded pap…
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Comment #45206036
You may wish to read what the current pure-capability CHERI Linux user ABI specifies for mremap(), because we (primarily Arm, in conjunction with us) have thought about this, and t…
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Comment #45205999
> Does that study include enabling intra object overflow protection, or not? > > When I say that this optional feature would force you to change a lot more code I’m comparing CHERI…
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Comment #45194569
Yeah you need a compiler, linker and OS. That's true of any security technology. CHERI may be more significant in that regard because it's a bigger rethink than just stuffing some …
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Comment #45194513
No. The capability itself lives in normal memory intermingling with data just like any other pointer. There is no "capabilities memory", it is just memory. In MTE, you have the N-b…
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Comment #45192137
Where studies suggest "a lot" is sub-0.1%. For example, https://www.capabilitieslimited.co.uk/_files/ugd/f4d681_e0f2... was a study into porting 6 million lines of C and C++ to run…
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Comment #45192097
Can you elaborate on what you perceive as broken?
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Comment #45192088
To reiterate what I've said elsewhere, CHERI does not need a whole parallel memory architecture, there is just one that gets a slight extension over a non-CHERI/MTE system to inclu…
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Comment #45192075
Cambridge and Arm have made a joint statement that nothing that is essential to the deployment of CHERI ("capability essential IP") is being patented by them: https://www.cl.cam.ac…
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Comment #45192047
> has a parallel capability stack There is one stack, the normal program stack that's normal main memory. > capability pointers If you use pure-capability CHERI C/C++ then there is…
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Comment #45192005
That's not true. Capabilities are in main memory as much as any other data. The tags are in separate memory (whether a wider SRAM, DRAM ECC bits, or a separate table off on the sid…
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Comment #45191990
We actually have ideas for how to combine the two; see section C.5 of https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-987.pdf
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Comment #41637144
64-bit size_t is the same on Darwin as GNU/Linux (unsigned long), but uint64_t is not (Darwin defines it as unsigned long long, not unsigned long). Perhaps this is what you remembe…
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Comment #41188117
Stop-the-world is only brief, to scan the register file of each thread and any other capabilities held in the kernel (asynchronous I/O, signal handlers, etc). Once done the entire …
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Comment #37797433
CHERI can provide heap temporal safety to protect against use-after-free (really, use-after-reallocation; use-after-free is harmless until the point at which the memory is being us…
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Comment #37797422
The hardware must, and does, ensure that the metadata (both addressable - bounds, permissions, etc - and non-addressable - the tag) is kept atomic with the address portion of the c…
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Comment #36095495
The SoC IP used in ASUS's Tinker V deliberately violates the virtual memory spec in a way that affects userspace, rendering certain virtual addresses unusable. This region overlaps…
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Comment #36079434
> Doing this at the actual hardware level (as you're implying with registers) doesn't really work - there's too much variation in how languages work, how languages work changes ove…
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Comment #34854885
They don't ship with spacers?
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Comment #30437884
Oh I know. Hardly inspires confidence; all of those examples are clear bugs declared features because of poor programming practices.
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Comment #30437371
> The if directive is tricky to use, especially in location{} blocks. It often doesn’t do what you expect and can even cause segfaults. That's not user error. That's lazy programmi…
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Comment #30029876
CHERI is not an actor system. It is a capability system aimed at memory protection. It can be used, like any other architecture, as a basis upon which to build an actor-based frame…
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Comment #30025575
Your research on actor-based programming models has nothing to do with C/C++ spatial and temporal memory safety.
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Comment #30015610
Yes it's non-zero, though https://www.capabilitieslimited.co.uk/pdfs/20210917-capltd-c... is a recent exploration of what it takes to port X11 and KDE to CHERI. Of the around 6 mil…
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Comment #30014076
Yes, though "software" is rather broad; where exactly the bounds setting happens is important as if you get it wrong it allows malicious software to not set bounds and be able to a…