Viewing profile — glenweyl

I couldn't agree more. Lots of social institutions would have to be built up around it to make it work. That is why we are starting on a small scale with market research.

That is the point of the software!

This is why there is a nominating procedure. I don't think this is a great forum for hashing this all out without a white board, but I would be happy to do it with a whiteboard. I …

For a long time I thought this too. But then Ken Arrow started working on QV and while he agrees that in spirit QV gets around the theorem, it does not to the letter. The reason is…

Look above; I address this extensively in the paper.

Exponential voting would be too close to 1p1v in effect, as we argue in the paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531

As Marty Gillens argues in his book Affluence and Influence ( http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9836.html ), on almost every issue there is a sub group within those who feel a part…

http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282

We are actively working on the identifiability issue; Ron Rivest (of RSA encryption) is writing a paper for a conference on the topic trying to solve this: http://bfi.uchicago.edu/…

Buying votes is not accepted. Using the system would be accepted, but not buying separately. Why couldn't we create a norm where buying outside the system is just as punished then …

This is a great question and one of the central ones my analysis addresses ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245 ). You can read the results in details for t…

As we prove in this paper ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245 ), a small group can never beat out a large population with an overall preference in the oppo…

You are absolutely right that QV can create speculative dynamics like a market place. Almost everything about QV is similar to the market mechanism. But do you really think that th…

I cannot completely follow this scenario, but if you can write it up as an actual equilibrium analysis I would be fascinated to see this. I have worked very hard to come up with ca…

Yes, in this paper ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012 ) I also consider the case where people make mistakes. You can study equilibrium even in models wher…

I completely agree. This is a crucial feature of QV with multiple alternatives. QV also has a nominating process to ensure the right things are on the ballot.

pas on vote buying, linear vote buying is bad according to the same theory that predicts QV is good. The only equilibrium under linear vote buying is that the single most intense (…

But it only grows with the square root of the number of wealthy individuals. See the paper with Posner; we go through many such calculations: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm…

What Lalley and I ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531 ) prove is that QV is provably the only system of vote pricing that gives you efficiency always, so i…

This is a great point. We address it in great depth in the paper with Posner, Voting Squared ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956 ). QV helps here, a lot we…

Fantastic question. QV does not really address this much; at a quantitative level you are right that it reduces the problem a bit, but you can't beat those asymptotic properties yo…

Agreed, but what I mean is it can't happen.

This is not an equilibrium; the down-winders would not vote unless they thought that vote mattered. In any case we have a nominating process to avoid this sort of manipulation; see…

Two sets, in very controlled laboratory settings, have turned out well: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&c... and http://rangevoting.org/GoereeZhangMar201…

I deal with this in another paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012