Viewing profile — decodebytes

Apologies, it should have been " A MicroVM.." but hit by the character title limit.

Same thoughts - we use an action to ship to production, its builds an image, pushes it to ECS which triggers a deployment. We can't be blocked here. Seems silly what we settled on …

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Overview of how I built in mini version of my previous project, sigstore rekor, into the nono.sh agent security framework.

Always Further, founded by team who created https://sigstore.dev , used to secure npm, pypi, brew, and provide attestations for github releases, nvidia and google for AI model sign…

If anyone wants native python sandboxing without needing a cloud API, we just shipped an early python SDK from the https://nono.sh project: import nono_py as nono # Define capabili…

nope - most folks wrap it in nono: https://nono.sh/docs/cli/clients/opencode

If anyone happens to be interested in sandboxing, a community of us are building https://nono.sh For what it's worth, it's not just whipped up in claude, a lot of us have a long ba…

Hey HN. I'm Luke, security engineer and creator of Sigstore and other open source security projects. I've been building nono, an open source sandbox for AI coding agents that uses …

Hey HN Luke here. I wanted to introduce a project I have building for the past few weeks in response to events such as openclaw and the glaring security issues at hand. Prior to no…

The problem: AI agents execute code on your machine. Prompt injections, hallucinations, or compromised tools can read ~/.ssh, exfiltrate credentials, or worse. Application-level sa…

This is why I started https://nono.sh , agents start with zero trust in a kernel isolated sandbox.

Good question - and the answer is no, they cannot escape. nono uses Landlock (Linux) and Seatbelt (macOS) - these are kernel-level security mechanisms. When a sandbox is created: A…