Viewing profile — bluegate010

Some prior art from 2006: https://www.flightglobal.com/darpa-and-nasa-demonstrate-worl... Video: https://youtu.be/F-Y7fhIasjM

Another talk about LMS / SPHINCS+: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZ1PnJml1CY

Not a stupid question. CDIs are groovy for minting secrets that are bound to the exact firmware that's running, but are a bit less ergonomic out of the box when it comes to keeping…

https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/critical

It sounds like, unless someone is an owner or maintainer of a critical open-source project, the blog post isn't necessarily calling for that person's deanonymization. For projects …

From the second link: > It is conceivable that contributors, unlike owners and maintainers, could be anonymous, but only if their code has passed multiple reviews by trusted partie…

Many of us on the Asylo team share your reservations about DRM. However, the capability to run software in a not-entirely-trustworthy environment leads to many positive possibiliti…

Asylo is not tied to EPID; the framework aims to abstract away any unique behavior specific to TEE implementations, and provide a common backend interface that developers can code …

Thanks for the helpful feedback. To answer your question: Asylo is currently x86 specific and provides a simulated enclave backend. We plan on evaluating additional enclave technol…

A couple practical benefits of Titan is that we can use it in many different environments where traditional secure boot is not available. For example, we're using it in both server…

Titan is one of the tools we use to protect against tampering, even down to the bootloader.

If the flash chip holding the boot firmware isn't really a flash chip, then indeed this could present an issue. However, since Titan interposes between flash and the PCH/BMC, it ca…

Titan is just one of several measures we take to harden our stack, and helps us be confident in the software we run. It's a good point though, there are no absolutes in security.

The log signing prevents undetected tampering after-the-fact; the goal is to make it readily apparent when log messages are altered or deleted, even by parties with root access.

Both the Titan chip and all software that runs on it are designed entirely in-house, so we have full control over the stack. And we do have physical tampering countermeasures in pl…

With Titan we know exactly how it is designed and how it'll behave. Titan is also platform-agnostic; it can work in many environments that Secure Boot cannot. Secure Boot also does…

We've actually got Titan earring swag we'll hopefully start distributing at upcoming recruiting / customer events, so images may start cropping up in short order. Why earrings? See…

Spicy raisin bars, an old family recipe. And a cucumber.

Hey HN, I'm one of the engineers on the team behind Titan, feel free to AMA.

This site exemplifies something that really annoys me with Google's material design framework. On my 13" screen, I can see a grand total of four items at a time: https://i.imgur.co…

Off-topic, but The Guardian's article landing page really needs to be cleaned up: http://i.imgur.com/3LGXU7g.png I can't make heads or tails of what I'm supposed to pay attention t…

I just recently had weeks of headaches over getting my server's email sent to spam. After setting up a brand new domain, with SPF, DKIM, etc., I woke up one morning to find my doma…

> If your keys are not protected by a passphrase Looks like the private key can be leaked regardless of the use of a passphrase, but you'd get the encrypted form that would need to…

An issue with passwordless is its vulnerability to passive attack. From perusing the source code, it looks like they authenticate users based on a token and uid embedded in a link …