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alexsmolen

HN member
Joined
Tue, Sep 25, 2012, 8:05 AM UTC
HN karma
36
Public activity
40 items

About alexsmolen

https://alexsmolen.com

Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #47925440

    I've been using elhaz ( https://github.com/61418/elhaz ) to manage AWS creds locally, and also experimenting with sandboxed (e.g. dangerously-skip-permissions) agents using Docker.…

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    Show HN: TrailTool – open-source CLI for querying CloudTrail data with AI agents

    I've been working on AWS security for years and querying CloudTrail has always been a huge pain - getting data about like "what did this role actually use in the last 30 days?" mea…

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    Comment #46952695

    I'm working on TrailTool, which aggregates CloudTrail for analysis in both UI and AI contexts. I've always found it tough to tie together CloudTrail logs into meaningful narratives…

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    Comment #46901591

    In my research I haven’t come across the prior art you suggest exists. The trust centers you linked aren’t fungible with what I’m building with GraphGRC. The idea is to make all yo…

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    Comment #46901179

    I love this idea despite the real world operational challenges - most people with governance responsibilities in organizations don't want to code, and code is often too precise to …

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    Comment #26404850

    This is a pretty good article about preventing SSRF including DNS rebinding-based attacks in Go https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/preventing_server_side_reque...

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    Comment #26403129

    Kind of wild that there's no mention of SSRF. A quick search shows it's a pretty frequent security issue in Webhooks: https://www.google.com/search?q=ssrf+webhook

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    Comment #21565109

    This is what https://tosback.org/ does, I believe.

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    Comment #13075438

    Yeah, I think it’s tricky to figure out how to place it somewhere that attackers would look but AWS tooling wouldn’t, by default, since otherwise they may be used in legitimate ope…

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    Comment #12821388

    I recently helped build a secret store system for our infrastructure, and we decided to not use Vault. A big reason was that Vault’s AWS authentication backend is not based on AWS …

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    Comment #12199754

    The problem is that SMS provides better recovery rates than TOTP/HOTP + backup codes, because people can go to their carrier and get a new device at the same number. It's important…

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