Viewing profile — agl
agl
HN member- Joined
- Tue, Aug 14, 2007, 11:55 PM UTC
- HN karma
- 2,229
- Public activity
- 249 items
- HN profile
- View on Hacker News ↗
About agl
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/agl; my proof: https://keybase.io/agl/sigs/tG9pHxVSSV14w9KD5hAohdi2NkDNPxULyFKL-OATzP4 ]
Recent public activity
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Comment #44368131
Setting a signature counter to constant zero is explicitly supported[1] and it's not a bug that it works. Google does not require the signature counter to increment; it's something…
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Comment #43866088
WebAuthn protects the sign in, but malware can still steal the resulting cookies. DBSC protects the sign in _session_. (It should stand for Don’t Bother Stealing Cookies.)
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Comment #40243844
It is a fair worry. On one side, there are sites with regulations that they are supposed to meet and it's hard to do so without knowing something about the passkey provider. If we …
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Comment #40242453
> The popular libraries seem to follow a kind of "shadow spec" where they agreed on using the URL-friendly variant of base64 WebAuthn itself uses base64url rather than base64. See,…
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Comment #39674495
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-merkle-t...
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Comment #31841258
2nd-factor WebAuthn should work fine with Android phones today. Any Android phone with a current version of Play Services and Chrome should be able to scan the QR code, if it doesn…
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Comment #31840425
Support is not yet available on Android but support for syncable passkeys on Android was announced for some time this year at Google I/O.
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Comment #24664881
You can just glue a wire to the touch plate and connect it to ground when you want to simulate a touch.
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Comment #20880666
I do not represent an NVLAP lab, but I'd question whether this would pass strict muster for FIPS given IG A.5: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-modu... (Disc…
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Comment #20463630
getrandom blocks until 128 bits of entropy have been collected since boot. It doesn't have the concept of "draining" the pool after the pool has been initialised.
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Comment #19653996
https://json5.org
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Comment #19307311
Early support should be appearing in the coming weeks on Canary channel when run with --enable-features=WebAuthenticationPINSupport
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Comment #18801909
There are various groupish signature systems (including DAA and BBS[1]) that would probably be a better answer here, _if you controlled the signers_. But, in this context, the devi…
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Comment #18624489
Google has not yet transitioned from the U2F API to the Web Authentication API for login so no, not yet. (We're working on it, but there's quite a lot of moving pieces.) Also, as a…
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Comment #18133530
> Is there anything in the standard about proving to the server that you have a genuine FIDO device Yes. When registering a credential you can request[1] attestation information. G…
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Comment #17612137
I don't know about the specific extension, but see https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/LZX...
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Comment #17611652
Webauthn and WebUSB UIs are very different. Additionally, Chrome has banned WebUSB from claiming Security Keys. However, it remains the case that if the user downloads and runs exe…
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Comment #17611513
Webauthn works with both FIDO1 and FIDO2 keys. (Unless you have the new, FIDO2 key from Yubico then you have a FIDO1 key). You might also see them called CTAP1 and CTAP2 keys becau…
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Comment #17611258
Sorry, I worded that poorly. U2F keys will continue to work fine, it's just the Javascript API that sites use that'll change. As a user, everything will keep working. Webauthn allo…
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Comment #17610895
> However, I've heard that Google is kind of going on a tangent with its own U2F implementations, emphasizing an old-school implementation instead of the Web Authentication Standar…
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Comment #16813513
It's possible that new primitives based on the same SI problem might have significant performance differences, but we're basing this on the NIST round one submissions. In that sett…
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Comment #16667219
> Does that assume that all of the components (browser and server) support 1.2 as well? No: a client, server, and MITM proxy can all be exclusively TLS 1.3 and everything will stil…
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Comment #16666888
It does not. There are some passive decryption tools that will no longer work because they functioned by having non-forward-secure connections and the server's private key installe…
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Comment #16511884
This is nonsense. The self-signature on a root certificate is irrelevant unless you can easily calculate second pre-images, and that's not true even of MD5, and accepting a root do…
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Comment #16496644
XMSS is great work, but it's not clearly suitable for use in SSH: I will occasionally copy SSH private keys around, or restore them from backups. I think that's fairly common. Howe…